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Chapter 2: The Cost of Fuel Economy in the Indian Car Market
To investigate how fuel economy is valued in the Indian car market, I compute
the cost to Indian consumers of purchasing a more fuel-efficient vehicle and compare
it to the benefit of lower fuel costs over the life of the vehicle. I estimate hedonic price
functions for four market segments (petrol hatchbacks, diesel hatchbacks, petrol
sedans, and diesel sedans) to compute 95% confidence intervals for the marginal cost
to the consumer for an increase in fuel economy. I find that the associated present
value of fuel savings falls within the 95% confidence interval for most specifications
in all market segments for the years 2002 through 2006. Thus, I fail to consistently
reject the hypothesis that consumers appropriately value fuel economy.
Also, I look at vehicle models available in both petrol and diesel form (i.e.,
twins). Diesel vehicles are generally more expensive than their petrol twins, but,
due to higher fuel economy and lower fuel price, have sufficiently lower fuel costs
to more than offset the difference. Net savings from purchasing a diesel twin are
substantial. Diesel hatchback owners save the equivalent of 50% of the purchase
price of their chosen vehicle; diesel sedan owners save 18% of the purchase price
of theirs. In 2006, 74% of twin hatchback owners and 59% of twin sedan owners
realized these savings by buying the diesel twin. Due to their lower monthly driving
distance, forgone savings by owners of petrol twins are lower, but still substantial.
Petrol hatchback owners could have saved 24% of the purchase price of their chosen
vehicle and petrol sedan owners could have saved 10%. Owners of petrol twins are
apparently willing to forgo these substantial savings in order to drive their preferred
vehicle.
Chapter 3: Policy Responses to Dieselization in the Indian Car Market
The Indian car market is the fastest growing in the world. With increased
mobility, however, has come increased foreign oil dependence, fuel consumption, and
associated externalities. In response to this, the Indian government is contemplating
fuel economy standards, but at the same time continues to subsidize diesel fuel.
The result of this policy has been a diesel discount of 30%, relative to petrol, and
dieselization, the increasing market share of diesel cars. This chapter uses a model of
vehicle choice and vehicle use to compare the welfare impacts of two possible policy
responses: diesel fuel taxation and diesel vehicle taxation. Using data comprised of
household-level vehicle purchase and driving distance observations from the 2006,
2008, and 2010 JD Power APEAL survey, I estimate a theoretically consistent model
of discrete-continuous choice which explicitly accounts for unobserved household and
vehicle characteristics and correlation between vehicle choice and driving distance.
I find the effect of a diesel fuel tax that eliminates the petrol/diesel price gap to be
4.6 percentage point reduction of the market share of diesel cars based on results
from 2006, a 7.9 percentage point reduction based on results from2008, and an 8.6
percentage point reduction based on results from 2010. On average, a diesel car
tax of 21.9% would achieve the same result. The diesel car tax option, however,
does relatively little to change intensive margin incentives. A smaller diesel fuel tax,
sufficient to yield the same total fuel conservation as the diesel car tax, compares
favorably to both policies on efficiency grounds. While the subsidy eliminating
diesel fuel tax is more efficient than the diesel car tax in terms of deadweight loss
per liter of fuel conserved, the smaller diesel fuel tax actually results in a net welfare
gain. This result comes from the fact that the pre-existing tax on petrol fuel raises
enough revenue from those would-be diesel car buyers who are compelled to buy a
petrol instead to more than compensate them back to their pre-tax utility levels.
Comparing compensating variation of the subsidy eliminating diesel fuel tax to the
diesel car tax, neither policy imposes a consumer welfare cost of more than 2% of
new car buyers’ average annual income. However, the welfare burden as a share of
household income is found to be greater for the poorest households.
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The Indian car market is among the fastest growing in the world. With in-
creased mobility, however, has come increased foreign oil dependence, fuel consump-
tion, and associated externalities. A recent report on vehicular pollution control
(Central Pollution Control Board, 2010) finds that road vehicle-related pollution
accounts for 70% of CO, 50% of HC, 30–40% of NOx, 30% of SPM, and 10% of
SO2 in India’s major metropolitan areas. While the majority of privately owned,
non-commercial vehicles, and the major contributor to road vehicle pollution, is
comprised of two-wheelers, recent studies suggest that the gap between car and mo-
torcycle ownership is quickly closing. Dargay et al. (2007) project continued growth
of the car market could lead to a car ownership rate of 110 cars per 1000 people by
2030, up from just 16 cars per 1000 people in 2010. With a population of over 1
billion people, the human health and welfare consequences of car-related pollution
are staggering. In response to this, the Indian government is becoming increasingly
aggresive in its approach to the regulation of transportation externalities. While
many studies of car regulation have been conducted in the United States and other
developed countries, little is known about how these lessons generalize to a develop-
ing country context. This dissertation seeks to fill this gap by providing results from
both reduced form and structural econometric analyses of the Indian car market.
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As fuel consumption is of concern for both energy security and environmental
reasons, much of the Indian debate has centered on policies to increase vehicle
fuel economy. One argument for fuel economy standards (as opposed to higher fuel
taxes) is that consumers undervalue fuel savings; that is, they fail to buy a more fuel-
efficient vehicle even though the additional purchase price is less than the present
value of fuel savings. The second chapter presents results from a hedonic price
function analysis designed to test this undervaluation hypothesis. To investigate
how fuel economy is valued in the Indian car market, I compute the cost to Indian
consumers of purchasing a more fuel-efficient vehicle and compare it to the benefit
of lower fuel costs over the life of the vehicle. I estimate hedonic price functions
for four market segments (petrol hatchbacks, diesel hatchbacks, petrol sedans, and
diesel sedans) to compute 95% confidence intervals for the marginal cost to the
consumer for an increase in fuel economy. I find that the associated present value
of fuel savings falls within the 95% confidence interval for most specifications in all
market segments for the years 2002 through 2006. Thus, I fail to consistently reject
the hypothesis that consumers appropriately value fuel economy.
To further consider how Indian consumers value fuel economy and other vehicle
characteristics, I look at vehicle models available in both petrol and diesel form (i.e.,
twins). Diesel vehicles are generally more expensive than their petrol twins, but,
due to higher fuel economy and lower fuel price, have sufficiently lower fuel costs
to more than offset the difference. Net savings from purchasing a diesel twin are
substantial. Diesel hatchback owners save the equivalent of 50% of the purchase
price of their chosen vehicle; diesel sedan owners save 18% of the purchase price
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of theirs. In 2006, 74% of twin hatchback owners and 59% of twin sedan owners
realized these savings by buying the diesel twin. Due to their lower monthly driving
distance, forgone savings by owners of petrol twins are lower, but still substantial.
Petrol hatchback owners could have saved 24% of the purchase price of their chosen
vehicle and petrol sedan owners could have saved 10%. Owners of petrol twins are
apparently willing to forgo these substantial savings in order to drive their preferred
vehicle.
The third chapter delves deeper into the notion of consumers’ willingness to
pay for preferred vehicle characteristics. Using data comprised of household-level
vehicle purchase and driving distance observations from the 2006, 2008, and 2010
JD Power APEAL survey, I estimate a theoretically consistent model of discrete-
continuous choice which explicitly accounts for unobserved household and vehicle
characteristics and correlation between vehicle choice and driving distance. I apply
the model to two potential policy responses to the increasing market share of diesel
cars: diesel fuel taxation and diesel car taxation.
I find the effect of eliminating the diesel subsidy to be a 2 percentage point
reduction of the market share of diesel cars based on results from 2006 and 2008. A
diesel car tax of 21% would achieve the same result. Based on 2010 results, however,
diesel subsidy removal results in a 9 percentage point reduction of the market share
of diesel cars, a result that requires a diesel car tax of just 19% to achieve. The diesel
car tax option, however, does relatively little to change intensive margin incentives.
2006 results show a reduction of diesel fuel consumption of only 7% compared to
37% for diesel subsidy elimination. Based on 2008 results, the effect would have
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been a 6% reduction in diesel fuel consumption from diesel car taxation vs. 34%
from diesel subsidy removal. Based on 2010 results, diesel car taxation would have
resulted in a 29% reduction in diesel fuel consumption vs. 59% for diesel subsidy
removal. Because of consumers’ ability to substitute among the wide variety of cars
now available in the Indian market, neither policy imposes a welfare cost of more
than 2% of new car buyers’ average annual income. However, the welfare burden as
a share of household income is found to be greatest for the poorest households.
Though the Indian car market is arguably in its early stages, current sales
growth rates, rapid economic development, and the shear numbers of potential own-
ers point to its increasing importance to India’s, and indeed the world’s, environment
and economy. The studies presented here provide a first look at some policy-relevant
aspects of a market that is shaping the future of Indian transportation. Though
much work remains, the following chapters also offer a glimpse into the extension of
lessons learned from the U.S. and Europe to a developing country context.
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Chapter 2
The Cost of Fuel Economy in the Indian Car Market
2.1 Introduction
As a result of India’s economic boom, the demand for passenger vehicles has
grown swiftly over the last decade. In April 2002, passenger vehicle sales were
approximately 50, 000; by April 2008, monthly sales had tripled to approximately
150, 000. To put these figures in perspective, January 2008 monthly sales were
approximately 1 million in the United States and approximately 650, 000 in China.
With such rapid growth, many in India are advocating for strong legislative action to
avoid the many economic, security, and environmental concerns that may accompany
the expansion of the vehicle fleet.
As fuel consumption is of concern for both energy security and environmental
reasons, much of the Indian debate has centered on policies to increase vehicle
fuel economy. One argument for fuel economy standards (as opposed to higher
fuel taxes) is that consumers undervalue fuel savings; that is, they fail to buy a
more fuel-efficient vehicle even though the additional purchase price is less than the
present value of fuel savings. This hypothesis has been tested extensively in the
United States. Although much of the literature suggests that consumers undervalue
fuel savings (Alcott and Wozny, 2010), other studies (Sallee et al., 2010) suggest
that consumers are willing to pay an extra dollar when buying a car to reduce the
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present value of fuel costs by a dollar. This essay examines how car buyers in India
value fuel savings.
The approaches that have been used to determine whether consumers under-
value fuel economy include hedonic price methods, studies of the impact of gasoline
prices on used car prices, and structural estimates of the parameters of consumers’
utility functions (Greene, 2010; Helfand and Wolverton, 2010). Hedonic price meth-
ods compare what consumers must pay for additional fuel economy in the market–as
estimated by a hedonic price locus–with the associated reduction in fuel expendi-
tures (Espey and Nair, 2005).1 If the two are equal, when evaluated at chosen vehicle
bundles, the null hypothesis that consumers rationally value fuel economy cannot be
rejected. The advantage of this approach is that it does not require data on market
shares; however, because estimates often rely on cross-sectional variation in vehicle
characteristics, multicollinearity can make it difficult to obtain precise estimates of
the marginal price of fuel economy, and omitted variable bias is a concern.
The hypothesis that consumers accurately value fuel economy has also been
tested using data on used car prices. Because the used car market is competitive, the
prices of used cars should adjust to reflect changes in the price of gasoline (Li et al.,
2009). Klier and Linn (2008) use a similar approach in the new car market. They
examine whether, within a given model year, monthly variation in gasoline prices is
reflected in new car prices and market shares. Indeed, if consumers correctly value
fuel economy, prices should adjust fully to reflect the change in the present value of
1In an oligopolistic car market, the hedonic price function represents the locus of opportunities
facing car buyers, even though it is no longer the envelope of tangencies between marginal bid and
marginal offer curves.
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fuel expenditures (Sallee et al., 2010). This can be tested by examining variation in
car and gasoline prices while holding vehicle characteristics fixed.2
A third approach, used by Alcott and Wozny (2010), is to examine how con-
sumers weigh the present value of fuel expenditures against purchase price, holding
other vehicle characteristics constant. This requires identifying the parameters of
consumers’ utility functions. Recognizing that both the demand and supply of new
vehicles respond to gasoline prices, Allcott and Wozny use expected vehicle oper-
ating cost at the time when the vehicle was new to instrument for the quantity of
used vehicles available on the market.
Unfortunately, approaches that have been used in the literature to examine
how consumers value fuel economy are difficult to apply in India because of a lack
of data (e.g., on used car prices) and insufficient variation in the price of fuel over
time. In this paper, I take a simpler hedonic price approach to examine how Indian
car buyers value fuel economy.
2.1.1 My Approach
I test the hypothesis that consumers accurately value fuel economy by com-
puting the marginal price that consumers face for an improvement in fuel economy
and comparing this to the present value of associated fuel savings. For each of
four vehicle types (petrol hatchbacks, diesel hatchbacks, petrol sedans, and diesel
sedans), I estimate hedonic price functions treating fuel economy as one of several
2This test rests on assumptions about future gasoline prices. Sallee et al. (2010) assume that
gasoline prices follow a random walk; hence today’s price is the best estimate of tomorrow’s
price. According to Anderson et al. (2010) consumer forecasts of gasoline prices agree with this
assumption.
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performance characteristics. To account for the possible correlation between fuel
economy and unobserved vehicle characteristics, I instrument for the fuel economy
of, for example, petrol hatchbacks of a given make using the average fuel economy of
petrol sedans of the same make. I use these estimates to compute a 95% confidence
interval for the marginal price of fuel economy and ask whether the present value of
fuel savings falls within this interval for the average buyer in each market.3
Based on these results, I cannot consistently reject the null hypothesis that
the mean consumer equates the marginal price of fuel economy to the present value
of fuel savings. In all markets and years, for most specifications of the hedonic price
function, the present value of fuel savings falls within the 95% confidence interval
of the fuel economy premium. The result is robust to the rate used to discount fuel
savings (10% or 15%) and to assumptions about future fuel price expectations (that
they will remain constant or increase at historic rates).
In addition to within-segment trade-offs, I examine the trade-offs faced by
buyers of twins, models that are available in both petrol and diesel form. Diesel
versions are generally more expensive than their petrol twins, but cost less to operate
because of their greater fuel economy and the fact that diesel fuel is 30% cheaper
than petrol. The savings that buyers of diesel twins realize over the life of their
vehicles are substantial. Over the expected life of his vehicle, the average diesel
3My hedonic analysis indicates that the new car market is segmented by vehicle size (hatchback
vs. sedan) and fuel type (petrol vs. diesel). So, the cost of buying additional fuel economy is
conditional on market segment. Average kilometers driven also vary by market segment. I judge
rationality conditional on market segment. I thus compute the fuel savings that diesel car buyers
would realize if they were to buy a more fuel-efficient diesel car, rather than the fuel savings a
person in the petrol hatchback market would realize if they were to buy a more fuel-efficient diesel
car.
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hatchback owner saved the equivalent of 50% of the purchase price of his vehicle
by selecting it over its petrol twin; the average diesel sedan owner saved 18%. The
percentage of twin hatchback owners taking advantage of these savings by buying
the diesel twin has risen each year from 46% in 2002 to 74% in 2006. Similarly, 17%
of twin sedan owners bought the diesel twin in 2002 and this rose to 59% in 2006.
Petrol car buyers drive fewer kilometers than buyers of diesel cars, but the fuel
savings from buying a diesel twin still outweigh the additional purchase price. Petrol
hatchback owners could have saved 24% of the purchase price of their chosen vehicle
by buying a diesel; petrol sedan owners could have saved 10%. Does this mean that
buyers of petrol twins undervalue fuel economy? Diesel cars, however, differ from
their petrol twins in other performance characteristics: they are generally heavier
and less powerful. It is possible that petrol car buyers accurately value fuel economy
but are willing to forgo potential savings to buy a more powerful car. In fact, the
fuel savings forgone are a lower bound to the value rational petrol car buyers place
on these differences in characteristics. I explore this further in Section 2.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents stylized
facts about the Indian car market. Section 2.3 presents the hedonic analysis and
Section 2.4 compares the cost and fuel economy of petrol and diesel twins. Section
2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Overview of the Indian Passenger Vehicle Market
Sales of passenger vehicles in India have been growing rapidly–from approxi-
mately 50, 000 cars per month in 2002 to approximately 150, 000 per month in 2008.
The market is highly concentrated, with the top five manufacturers accounting for
nearly 90% of the market between 2002 and 2006. Maruti Suzuki accounted for 48%
of sales, Tata Motors 18%, and Hyundai 15%. Mahindra and Toyota each accounted
for 4%. Figure 2.1 shows average market shares by body type and fuel type for the
same period. The majority of passenger vehicles sold in India are small cars: hatch-
backs constitute approximately 65% of the market, sedans about 17%, sport utility
vehicles (SUVs) 12%, and vans 5%. The remainder of the market is composed of
multi-use vehicles (MUVs), wagons, and coupes.
Averaged over the years 2002 through 2006, 73% of passenger vehicles ran
on petrol and 27% on diesel, but the fuel breakdown varied significantly by body
type. Approximately 85% of hatchbacks and 75% of sedans ran on petrol, whereas
virtually all SUVs ran on diesel (only 3% used petrol). Because I examine the
petrol/diesel fuel choice, the remainder of the paper focuses on hatchbacks and
sedans. For hatchbacks, diesel market share has remained constant at around 15%
between 2002 and 2006. For sedans, a trend of increasing diesel market share (i.e.,
dieselization) has taken place, from 11% in 2002 to 32% in 2006.
During the period of study fuel prices were set by the Indian government and
varied little across cities.4 In this analysis, I use fuel prices in Delhi. In 2008 petrol in
4In 2006 the average price of petrol (in 2008 Rs. per liter) based on 25 Indian cities was
51.6, with a standard deviation of 2.34. (The corresponding diesel figures are Rs. 36.2 with a
standard deviation of 2.01.) Since 2010 the Indian government has not controlled the price of
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Delhi sold at 45 Rs. per liter ($4.20 per gallon) and diesel at 31 Rs. per liter ($2.90
per gallon). Diesel fuel in India is priced below petrol because of its uses in the
agricultural sector. The gap between the two fuel prices has remained constant in
percentage terms since around 2002, but the historic percentage gap is even greater.
Between 2002 and 2008, the price of diesel and petrol (in real terms) rose by about
2 Rs. per year.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 describe the characteristics of petrol and diesel hatchbacks
and sedans. Table 2.1 describes vehicle characteristics at the model level (e.g.,
Honda Accord) for the period 2002 to 2006, weighted by market share. Table 2.2
summarizes the same variables at the version level (e.g., Honda Accord LX), not
weighted by market share, for the period 2002 through 2008. These are the data
used to estimate the hedonic price functions.
Vehicle characteristics data, which cover the period 2002 to 2008, come from
AutoCar India, an Indian car industry magazine, and Segment Y, a private market
research firm. Additional data on body type classification and fuel type come from
Carwale, a website that provides information for car buyers (www.Carwale.com).
All market share data come from SIAM statistics and the 2002–2006 waves of the
J.D. Power Asia Pacific APEAL study, an annual survey of approximately 5, 000
new car buyers in India.
Throughout the paper, I focus on city fuel economy rather than highway fuel
economy. AutoCar India reports both city and highway fuel economy data; how-
ever, city fuel economy data correlate much better with fuel economy data reported
petrol; however, as of this writing, it controls the price of diesel.
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by respondents in the APEAL survey. A regression through the origin of buyers’
estimates of fuel economy on published estimates of city fuel economy yields a co-
efficient of 1.14 (s.e.=0.010); when highway fuel economy is added to the equation,
the coefficient on city fuel economy equals 1.09 (s.e.=0.099) and the coefficient on
highway fuel economy is 0.034 (s.e.=0.071).5
How do diesel and petrol cars compare in terms of fuel economy and other
performance characteristics? Diesel hatchbacks are heavier and less powerful than
petrol hatchbacks (see Table 2.1) but have better fuel economy in city driving. The
fact that diesel hatchbacks weigh more reflects their larger engine size: no diesel
hatchbacks are produced with engines smaller than 1,250 cubic centimeters, which
is larger than the mean petrol hatchback engine. On average, diesel hatchbacks have
higher torque than petrol hatchbacks, but their ratio of torque to weight is lower.
Diesel hatchbacks have about 1 kilometer-per-liter (kpl) greater fuel economy than
petrol hatchbacks (sales-weighted). The difference in fuel economy is much greater
between diesel and petrol sedans: diesel sedans have about 2.7 kpl greater fuel
economy than petrol sedans. Diesel sedans have a horsepower-to-weight ratio that
is only 70% of that of a petrol sedan, but have 15% more torque and a 5% higher
torque-to-weight ratio.
To put this study in perspective, I note that Indian cars are lighter and less
powerful than cars in the United States (Environmental Protection Agency, 2008).
Between 2002 and 2006, the average weight of an Indian petrol hatchback (sales-
5I do not use self-reported fuel economy data from the APEAL survey because it is reported
at the model, but not the version, level.
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weighted) was about 1, 700 pounds; for an Indian petrol sedan it was 2, 300 pounds.
In the United States in 2006, the average car weighed approximately 3, 500 pounds.6
The average horsepower-to-weight ratio (in horsepower per pound) was 0.032 for the
Indian petrol hatchback, 0.041 for the Indian petrol sedan, and 0.054 for an average
car in the United States. In view of their lighter weight and lower horsepower ratio,
it is not surprising that the average fuel economy of the Indian petrol hatchback and
sedan (28.5 and 22.6 miles per gallon in city driving, respectively) was greater than
that of the average U.S. car (19.4 miles per gallon).7 Estimates of fuel economy
technical frontiers, which show how fuel economy varies with vehicle characteristics,
suggest that Indian cars are not necessarily as fuel efficient as U.S. cars, holding
weight and horsepower constant.8
2.3 Hedonic Price Approach
The hedonic approach to evaluating how buyers value fuel economy asks
whether consumers equate the marginal cost of buying a more fuel-efficient vehi-
cle to the present value of fuel savings. Such a comparison tests the null hypothesis
that new car buyers are willing to pay an extra rupee in purchase price to decrease
the present value of fuel costs by a rupee. Formally, new car buyers face a function
that describes vehicle price (P ) as a function of fuel economy (kpl) and other vehicle
6The EPA car category is comparable to hatchbacks and sedans, as it excludes SUVs, wagons,
vans, and pickup trucks.
7The figures for the United States are the adjusted city miles per gallon as reported in Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (2008), rather than laboratory results.
8When a fuel economy technical frontier model estimated using Indian data is used to predict
the fuel economy of an average U.S. car, predicted fuel economy is less than 16 miles per gallon.
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characteristics (Z), such as weight, horsepower, and type of transmission (automatic
or manual). I assume quasilinear preferences over consumption of an outside good
(x) and vehicle subutility (u), which depends on Z and driving distance, but not
directly on fuel economy. K denotes the vector of distances driven each year over
the car’s lifetime. Each buyer chooses the (Z,K, kpl) bundle that maximizes his
utility (U),
U  x  upZ,Kq. (2.1)
If the buyer is sufficiently forward-looking, he considers the impact of kpl on
the present value of fuel costs over the life of the vehicle, and thus faces the budget
constraint,








In equation 2.2, T is the life of the vehicle, r is the buyer’s discount rate, pf ptq is
the (expected) price of fuel in year t, and ptq is the vehicle’s probability of survival
to year t. The first-order conditions to this problem imply that, at chosen level of
fuel economy, the marginal cost of an additional unit of fuel economy must equal










To test whether this condition is satisfied, I estimate hedonic price functions fac-
ing consumers in four vehicle markets–petrol hatchbacks, diesel hatchbacks, petrol
sedans, and diesel sedans–and compute the 95% confidence intervals for the cost of a
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1 kpl increase in fuel economy, evaluated at the sales-weighted mean (Z, kpl) vector
for each vehicle type. I compute the associated reduction in fuel costs over the life
of the vehicle based on the sales-weighted mean driving distance in each market.
Because I focus on sales-weighted mean vehicle characteristics and driving
distances, ours is a test of whether car buyers choose fuel economy optimally, on
average. Note also that equation 2.2 treats the new car buyer as the sole owner of the
vehicle. A rational new car buyer who keeps a car until it is scrapped is equivalent
to a rational new car buyer who can sell the vehicle to another rational (used) car
buyer before it is scrapped. Thus the null hypothesis assumes that both the new
and used car markets operate efficiently. An alternative would be to evaluate the
rationality of new car buyers, conditional on prices in the used car market. Data on
the used car market in India, however, are not readily available.
2.3.1 Estimation of the Hedonic Price Function
The problems involved in estimating the marginal price of fuel economy using
hedonic price functions are well known. Correlation between fuel economy and ve-
hicle characteristics, such as weight and horsepower, make precise estimation of the
marginal price difficult, and correlation between fuel economy and unobserved vehi-
cle characteristics (such as acceleration) leads to omitted variable bias, which renders
estimates inconsistent (Atkinson and Halvorsen, 1984; Espey and Nair, 2005). To
deal with these issues, I estimate different specifications of the hedonic price function
and instrument for fuel economy. For comparison purposes, I also present ordinary
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least squares (OLS) results.
In each specification, the logarithm of vehicle price is expressed as a function




izji   j (2.4)
where zji is the i
tℎ characteristic of vehicle j.9
The vehicle characteristics that are most highly correlated with fuel economy,
but which are valued in their own right, are vehicle weight and engine performance.
Engine performance is usually measured by torque (or horsepower) and by engine
size.10 Horsepower (or torque) relative to vehicle weight determines how much
“pickup” a car has (i.e., how well it accelerates). I use different combinations of
engine size, torque, and the ratio of horsepower to weight to measure performance.
All four specifications of the hedonic price function include fuel economy, weight,
indices that measure a vehicle’s luxury and safety features, and whether the car has
an automatic transmission. Specification 1 uses the ratio of horsepower to weight
to measure performance; specification 2 adds engine size to specification 1. Speci-
fication 3 measures performance by torque, and specification 4 adds engine size to
specification 3. The data used to estimate hedonic price functions (summarized in
Table 2.2) include all versions available in each market over the period 2002–2008,
unweighted by sales.
9Cropper et al. (1988) find that hedonic price functions that are linear in the explanatory
variables perform better than functions using quadratic forms of the explanatory variables when
some variables are measured with error or missing from the equation.
10Holding engine speed constant, horsepower is a multiple of torque.
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I separate the market into sedans and hatchbacks as vehicles of very different
sizes and price ranges are unlikely to be close substitutes. I also segment the market
according to fuel type as the marginal price of fuel economy is likely to differ by fuel
type as a result of the diesel-petrol price differential. Wald tests allow us to reject
the null hypothesis that these market segments should be combined.
I instrument for fuel economy because gains in fuel economy are often achieved
by sacrifices in weight, horsepower, and other desirable characteristics. Although I
control for observable characteristics in the model, failure to account for correlation
between higher fuel economy and unobservable attributes may bias fuel economy
coefficients downward. I instrument for the fuel economy of petrol hatchbacks of
a given make using the average fuel economy of petrol sedans of the same make.
I instrument for the fuel economy for each petrol sedan of a given make using the
average fuel economy of petrol hatchbacks of the same make. Instruments for diesel
vehicles are constructed analogously. For example, the 2002 Fiat petrol hatchbacks,
the Palio (which comes in 11 versions), and the Uno (which comes in 2 versions),
all have the same value of the instrument, which is constructed as the average fuel
economy of all 7 versions of the 2002 Fiat petrol sedan (the Siena). The 2002 Fiat
Siena (all 7 versions) share the same IV value, which is equal to the average fuel
economy of all 13 2002 Fiat petrol hatchbacks.
The instrument is constructed to reflect the fuel economy technology available
to manufacturers at the time of vehicle design. Sedan fuel economy should be
correlated with hatchback fuel economy, but not with unmeasured hatchback design
characteristics, provided manufacturers’ design decisions are made separately for
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each vehicle segment. Even if this last assumption is violated, I believe that sedan
fuel economy will certainly be less correlated with unmeasured hatchback design
features than the hatchback’s own fuel economy.
2.3.2 Hedonic Price Function Results
Instrumental variable (IV) estimates of of the hedonic price function are pre-
sented in Tables 2.4–2.7.11 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates and IV esti-
mates of the fuel economy coefficients are presented for all four specifications in Table
2.8.12 To focus the discussion, I give special attention to specification 4 which fits
well in all market segments. Most coefficients are statistically significant, with ex-
pected signs. Vehicle price varies positively with weight, torque, engine size, luxury
index, and automatic transmission (relative to manual). For all vehicle categories,
quality-adjusted prices are approximately 20–40% lower in 2008 than in 2002. Hold-
ing vehicle characteristics constant, petrol car prices have fallen more than diesel
car prices.
What is the marginal cost to consumers of buying a car with greater fuel
economy? IV estimates from Table 2.8 suggest that the cost of fuel economy ranges
from 1–10% of vehicle price. As expected, this is higher than the marginal cost in the
OLS models, suggesting that fuel economy is negatively correlated with desirable,
but unmeasured, vehicle characteristics.
I compute 95% confidence intervals for the cost of a 1 kpl increase in fuel
11First stage results for specification 4 are presented in Table A.1 of Appendix A.
12Full OLS results are presented in Tables A.2–A.5 of Appendix A.
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economy holding all other vehicle characteristics at their sales-weighted means for
each year. Table 2.9 presents these cost calculations for years 2002–2006 for each
market segment based on the IV results from specification 4. The marginal price
of fuel economy is generally falling between 2002 and 2005. This reflects the fact
that, holding vehicle characteristics constant, the real price of a car is falling in each
market over this period.
2.3.3 The Savings from Improved Fuel Economy
I compute the savings from a 1 kpl increase in fuel economy using the discrete
counterpart to equation 2.3,
Ţ
t0









Savings are evaluated in each market segment based on the mean monthly driving
distance by buyers in that segment, averaged over the years 2002 through 2006.
These monthly driving distances are 1, 070 kilometers (petrol hatchback owners),
1, 870 kilometers (diesel hatchback owners), 1, 300 kilometers (petrol sedan owners),
and 1, 870 kilometers (diesel sedan owners). I use these driving distances to estimate
Kp0q (distance driven during the first year of ownership) and then allow Kptq to
decline at a rate of 2.5% per year as the car ages. This is the rate at which distance
driven declines in the US (Lu, 2006). Barth et al. (2007) suggest that distance driven
may decline more rapidly in India, suggesting that these estimates may overstate
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fuel cost savings.13
To calculate fuel savings, I must also make assumptions about vehicle life,
interest rates, and future fuel prices. The probability of a car surviving to each
future age, ptq, is based on a survival curve for Indian cars estimated by Arora
et al. (2011). Their survival curve sets T equal to 20 and implies an expected
vehicle life of 18 years. In contrast, the expected life of a car in the United States
is 13 years (Lu, 2006). Interest rates are also higher in India than in the United
States. I use a discount rate of 15% for car buyers, based on interest rates charged
on new car loans in India and note that about 80% of new car purchases are financed
with such loans (Shankar, 2007; Carazoo.com, 2011; Seth, 2009). As a sensitivity
analysis, I also use a discount rate of 10% (the return on certificates of deposits in
India in 2011).14 Following Anderson et al. (2010), I assume that consumers expect
future fuel prices to follow a random walk. This allows us to replace pf ptq in equation
2.5 with pf p0q, the price of fuel at the time of vehicle purchase.15 As a sensitivity
analysis, I allow pf ptq to increase at the rate of 2 Rs. per year, approximately the
average rate of increase for both diesel and petrol over the 2002–2008 period.
In addition to the 95% confidence intervals of the cost of a 1 kpl increase in fuel
economy, Table 2.9 presents point estimates of the present value of corresponding
13Barth et al. (2007) report that distance driven decrease with vehicle age at the rate of 794
kilometers per year, based on data from Pune. Unfortunately this is based on vehicles aged 13
years or younger, so that distance driven falls to zero at age 13. Since the expected vehicle life is
18 years, distance driven cannot decrease this rapidly.
14http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-02-03/news/28427857_1_cd-
rates-short-term-rates-policy-rates
15For each model year, I construct a sales-weighted average petrol price and a sales-weighted
average diesel price. I weight monthly fuel price, reported in Indiastat.com, by monthly vehicle
sales.
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fuel savings. Fuel savings calculations are presented for both discount rate assump-
tions and both fuel price expectations assumptions. Fuel savings are increasing in
absolute terms over the 2002 to 2006 period as a result of increases in the real prices
of both diesel and petrol. In all years, fuel savings are sensitive to discount rate and
fuel price expectations assumptions. To illustrate, 2006 fuel savings are 57% higher
for petrol vehicles and 70% higher for diesel vehicles using a discount rate of 10%
and allowing prices to increase by 2 Rs. per year, compared to a discount rate of
15% and an assumption of constant real fuel prices.
To test the null hypothesis that consumers equate the marginal price of fuel
economy to the present value of fuel savings, I subtract the fuel savings reported in
Table 2.9 from the marginal price of fuel economy (based on Table 2.9) to construct
95% confidence intervals of the net costs of purchasing additional fuel economy. If
zero lies within this interval, I cannot reject the null hypothesis. Figure 2.2 presents
results based on a discount rate of 15% and the assumption that fuel prices are
expected to remain constant. Figure 2.3 uses a discount rate of 10% and assumes
that fuel prices are expected to increase at 2 Rs. per year.
The results presented in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, based on hedonic price function
specification 4, show that for all four segments in all years I find no evidence of
fuel economy undervaluation. In fact, in Figure 2.2 consumers in the diesel hatch-
back market appear to be overvaluing fuel economy in 2002 to 2004. Using other
specifications of the hedonic price function (see Table 2.9) I generally fail to reject
the hypothesis that consumers equate the cost of additional fuel economy to the
present value of fuel savings. The only cases in which consumers undervalue fuel
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economy occur in the 2005 and 2006 markets for petrol hatchbacks when results
from specifications 1 or 2 are combined with the 10% discount rate and increasing
fuel price assumptions. Overall, these results provide little support for the argument
that fuel economy standards in India are justified because consumers undervalue fuel
economy.
2.4 Lowering Fuel Costs by Purchasing a Diesel Vehicle
Another way in which consumers can reduce their fuel costs is to purchase a
diesel rather than a petrol car. In this section, I compare the additional cost of
buying a diesel vehicle with the savings in fuel costs using data on twins–models
that are available in both diesel and petrol form. More sedans than hatchbacks
are available in diesel form. Of the 34 petrol sedan models available in 2006, 12 of
them had diesel twins, whereas only two of 11 petrol hatchback models available
in 2006 had a diesel twin. A similar pattern is reflected in market shares: in 2002,
twins accounted for 62% of sedan sales and 31% of hatchback sales. In 2006, twins
accounted for 54% of sedan and 19% of hatchback sales.
On average, diesel twins cost more, but have better fuel economy. Table 2.10
shows results of regressing the log of vehicle price and the log of fuel economy on
a diesel dummy variable and model-year dummy variables for the hatchback and
sedan markets. On average, diesel hatchbacks cost 9.5% more than their petrol
twins; diesel sedans cost 7.7% more. The difference in fuel economy is large: diesel
hatchbacks are on average 27%, and diesel sedans 30%, more fuel efficient than their
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petrol twins.
2.4.1 The Cost Savings from Buying a Diesel Twin
The cost advantage of a diesel twin is the difference between the purchase price
of the petrol and diesel versions of the vehicle plus the present value of savings in
fuel costs over the life of the vehicle,16













where the p and d subscripts refer to petrol and diesel, respectively.
The fuel savings of a diesel are substantial: the fuel cost per kilometer of a
diesel car is about half that of its petrol twin. To illustrate, a petrol sedan that
achieves average fuel economy (9 kpl) costs 5 Rs. per kilometer to operate at a
petrol price of 45 Rs. per liter. Its diesel twin, with a fuel economy of 12 kpl,
costs only 2.5 Rs. per kilometer because diesel fuel is one-third cheaper (30 Rs.
per liter). The corresponding figures for hatchbacks are 4.5 Rs. per kilometer for
petrol hatchbacks vs. 2.3 Rs. per kilometer for their petrol twins.17 In both cases,
two-thirds of the reduction in fuel costs is due to the lower price of diesel fuel and
one-third to the better fuel economy of diesel vehicles.18
Total fuel savings from buying the diesel twin increase with driving distance.
16This ignores differences in maintenance costs and survival probabilities between diesel and
petrol vehicles.
17This is based on 10 kpl for a petrol hatchback and 13 kpl for a diesel hatchback.
18At 9 kpl, the petrol sedan would cost 30{9  3.33 Rs. per kilometer if petrol cost the same per
liter as diesel. Increasing fuel economy from 9 to 12 kpl reduces the cost per kilometer from 3.33
to 2.5 Rs. So 1.67 Rs. of the 2.5-Rs. reduction in cost comes from the lower cost of diesel fuel.
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For buyers who drive 2, 000 kilometers per month, the present value of fuel savings
is about 240, 000 Rs. over the life of a hatchback and 320, 000 Rs. over the life
of a sedan. For buyers who drive 1, 000 kilometers per month, the savings are still
substantial: about 98, 800 Rs. for a hatchback and 139, 000 Rs. for a sedan. To
obtain net savings, the difference in purchase price of the diesel and petrol vehicles
(41, 400 Rs. for hatchbacks and 86, 600 Rs. for sedans) must be subtracted from
the fuel savings.
I have calculated the net fuel savings from buying a diesel for 21 hatchback
and 70 sedan models for which a twin was available over the period 2002–2006. In
these computations, fuel savings are based on mean monthly driving distances for
each vehicle type, using a 15% discount rate and constant fuel price expectations.
Expressed as a percentage of the average price of his chosen vehicle type, the average
net fuel savings realized by buyers of diesel hatchbacks was 50%. The corresponding
figure for diesel sedan owners was 18%. At the same time, buyers of petrol hatch-
backs gave up savings equal to 24% of the price of their cars, and buyers of petrol
sedans gave up savings equal to 10% of the price of their cars.
What percentage of twin buyers realized these savings? In 2006, 74% of hatch-
back twin buyers bought a diesel hatchback, and 59% of sedan twin buyers bought a
diesel sedan; these percentages have risen steadily since 2002. Clearly, the majority
of twin buyers realized significant savings. Does this mean that the buyers of petrol
twins undervalued fuel savings? As Table 2.11 shows, diesel and petrol twins differ
noticeably in weight and in performance: diesel twins are generally heavier and less
powerful than their petrol counterparts. It could be that buyers of petrol twins
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value these characteristics enough to forgo the fuel savings from buying a diesel.
2.4.2 The Value Petrol Car Buyers Place on the Petrol Twin
It is straightforward to show that the net fuel expenditure savings forgone by
petrol car buyers (equation 2.6) is a lower bound to the money these buyers would
have to receive to keep their utility constant if they were forced to buy the diesel twin
instead. Let x denote the income remaining after the petrol car buyer purchases
a petrol car (Zp) and drives K
 kilometers. Let x1 denote the income remaining if
he drives K kilometers but buys the diesel twin (Zd). If the buyer is rational, he
prefers (x, Zp, K
) to (x1, Zd, K
); that is,
Upx, Zp, Kq ¡ Upx1, Zd, Kq. (2.7)
There is, however, some amount of money, x̂, that will make him as happy as with
the petrol twin, implicitly defined by
Upx, Zp, Kq  Upx̂, Zd, Kq. (2.8)
To keep his utility constant, the amount the petrol buyer would have to be given (his
compensating variation) if forced to buy a diesel car is x̂x. Because x̂ ¡ x1, x1x
is a lower bound to this value. From equation 2.6, x1  x equals the net value of
fuel savings from buying a diesel; that is, equation 2.6 evaluated at K.
This implies that the lower bound to the value placed on characteristics Zp
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(vs. Zd) is approximately 110, 000 Rs. for buyers of petrol hatchbacks and 153, 000
Rs. for buyers of petrol sedans. It is, of course, impossible to say whether this is
rational. To judge how these car buyers valued fuel economy requires estimating a
model of the demand for vehicle characteristics (see Alcott and Wozny (2010)).
2.5 Conclusion
The debate over mitigating the environmental impact of India’s rapidly ex-
panding vehicle fleet has centered on reducing fuel consumption. One commonly
cited justification for fuel economy standards, as opposed to higher fuel taxes, is the
belief that consumers undervalue fuel economy when making purchasing decisions.
I have addressed this concern by comparing the cost to consumers of increased fuel
economy to the associated fuel savings. Based on IV estimates of hedonic price func-
tions, I cannot consistently reject the hypothesis that the mean consumer equates
the marginal price of fuel economy to the present value of fuel savings. To test
this hypothesis, I have estimated the marginal cost of fuel economy to consumers
in four market segments using four specifications of the hedonic price function for
five model years. By comparing these results to fuel price savings calculated under
two sets of alternate assumptions about the discount rate and future fuel price ex-
pectations, I put consumer rationality to the test a total of 160 times. Of the 31
instances in which I reject the hypothesis, only nine provide any evidence of fuel
economy undervaluation while the remaining 22 indicate that consumers may, in
fact, be overvaluing fuel economy.
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To further understand the trade-offs faced by consumers, I considered the
choices faced by potential buyers of twins. Diesel versions of twins are, in general,
more expensive than their petrol counterparts but have sufficiently lower operating
costs as to more than offset the difference in purchase price. Net savings from
purchasing a diesel twin are substantial. By choosing their vehicle over its petrol
twin, diesel hatchback owners save the equivalent of 50% of the purchase price of
their chosen vehicle; diesel sedan owners save 18%. In 2006, 74% of twin hatchback
owners and 59% of twin sedan owners realized these savings by buying the diesel
twin. Because of their lower monthly driving distance, forgone savings by owners
of petrol twins are lower, but still substantial: petrol hatchback owners could have
saved 24% of the purchase price of their chosen vehicles, and sedan owners 10%,
by buying a diesel. This does not mean that buyers of petrol twins were irrational;
they may have been willing to forgo these savings to drive a more powerful petrol
vehicle.
There are limits to what can be said using the data on vehicle characteristics
and prices used in this paper. The next step in this analysis is to estimate models
of vehicle demand and miles driven using individual household data on vehicle pur-
chases. These models can be used to compute the welfare effects of changes in fuel
taxes (e.g., the impact of equalizing the cost of diesel and petrol) and of imposing
fuel economy standards. If, for example, auto manufacturers in India were to meet
fuel economy standards by reducing vehicle weight and horsepower, as was done
in the United States (Klier and Linn, 2008), this could result in a welfare loss to
Indian consumers. To justify such an intervention, these losses should be compared
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to the welfare gains from reduced pollution, congestion, and dependence on foreign
oil. Such a comparison of costs and benefits cannot be accomplished without first
quantifying both.
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Price 105 Rupees 2008 4.09 4.63 8.76 8.62
(USD 2008) (10400) (11800) (22200) (21900)
Weight 1000 kilograms 0.773 0.976 1.04 1.13
(pounds) (1700) (2150) (2300) (2490)
Power Ratio horsepower/kilogram 0.0707 0.0559 0.0892 0.0607
(horsepower/pound) (0.0321) (0.0254) (0.0405) (0.0275)
Engine Size cubic centimeters 972 1420 1540 1570
Torque kilogram-meters 7.89 9.00 13.0 14.9
(foot-pounds) (57.0) (65.1) (94.1) (108)
City Fuel Economy kilometers/liter 12.1 13.0 9.60 12.3
(miles/gallon) (28.5) (30.7) (22.6) (29.0)
Luxury Indexa 2.04 2.16 4.71 4.11
Safety Indexb 0.427 0.221 0.889 0.978
Automatic 0.131 0.000 0.124 0.005
Distance Driven kilometers/month 1070 1870 1300 1870
(miles/month) (663) (1160) (808) (1160)
# of models 43 12 72 31
Notes: Version level vehicle characteristics data come from AutoCar India and Segment Y.
Model/fuel-type level market share data come from SIAM and the JD Power APEAL survey. Each
model is available in multiple versions. For each year, and for each vehicle category, model/fuel-
type level vehicle characteristics are constructed as the unweighted average across all available
versions of each model/fuel-type. The within-year sales-weighted average of these models is cal-
culated for each vehicle category. The resulting year-representative vehicles are averaged across
years 2002 to 2006 and presented above.
a Luxury index is defined as the sum of www.Carwale.com luxury rating(0-none, 1-luxury, or
2-super luxury) and the dummy variables for air conditioning, power steering, central locking,
power windows, alloy wheels, leather seats, power mirrors, and CD player.
b Safety index is defined as the sum of the dummy variables for airbags, rear seat belts, antilock
braking system, and traction control.
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Price 105 Rupees 2008 4.71 4.84 14.3 13.0
(1.42) (0.758) (15.8) (9.24)
Weight 1000 kilograms 0.907 0.991 1.19 1.22
(0.155) (0.0950) (0.219) (0.170)
Power Ratio horsepower/kilograms 0.0749 0.0603 0.0946 0.0666
(0.00906) (0.00900) (0.0191) (0.0175)
Engine Size cubic centimeters 1160 1570 1810 1810
(244) (220) (580) (317)
Torque kilogram-meters 9.81 10.8 16.1 18.4
(2.32) (2.85) (6.04) (8.47)
City Fuel Economy kilometers/liter 11.0 13.1 8.70 11.6
(1.42) (1.12) (1.37) (1.67)
Luxury Indexa 2.91 2.48 5.82 5.50
(1.73) (1.47) (2.56) (2.62)
Safety Indexb 0.775 0.781 1.71 1.61
(0.727) (0.766) (1.41) (1.46)
Automatic 0.041 0.000 0.212 0.146
(0.199) (0.000) (0.409) (0.354)
# of versions 244 64 411 158
Notes: Version level vehicle characteristics data come from AutoCar India. For each vehicle cat-
egory, the unweighted average across all available versions from years 2002 to 2008 is presented
above with standard deviations in parentheses.
a Luxury index is defined as the sum of www.Carwale.com luxury rating(0-none, 1-luxury, or
2-super luxury) and the dummy variables for air conditioning, power steering, central locking,
power windows, alloy wheels, leather seats, power mirrors, and CD player.
b Safety index is defined as the sum of the dummy variables for airbags, rear seat belts, antilock
braking system, and traction control.
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Table 2.3: Explanatory Variables
Variable Description
Price Price of vehicle in Delhi inclusive of taxes and fees in
2008 rupees
Weight Weight of vehicle in thousands of kilograms
Power Ratio Ratio of horsepower to vehicle weight (horsepower/kilograms)
Engine Size Volume of engine (cubic centimeters)
Torque Engine torque (kilogram-meters)
Luxury Index The sum of Carwale.com luxury rating (0-none, 1-luxury, or
2-super luxury) and the dummy variables for air conditioning,
power steering, central locking, power windows, alloy wheels,
leather seats, power mirrors, and cd player
Safety Undex The sum of the dummy variables for airbags, rear seat belts,
antilock braking system, and traction control
Automatic A dummy variable for transmission type
(0-manual or 1-automatic)
City Fuel Economy Fuel economy measured under urban driving conditions in
kilometers per liter
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Table 2.4: Hedonic Price Function IV Estimation Results–Petrol Hatchback
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price)
City Fuel Economy 0.0316* 0.0155 0.0935*** 0.0899***
(0.0179) (0.0302) (0.0314) (0.0285)
Weight 0.975*** 1.099*** 0.593*** 0.548***
(0.119) (0.102) (0.147) (0.130)
Power Ratio 10.93*** 12.77***
(1.069) (1.669)




Luxury Index 0.0721*** 0.0713*** 0.0852*** 0.0845***
(0.00512) (0.00505) (0.00669) (0.00646)
Safety Index -0.0294** -0.0296** -0.0349* -0.0286*
(0.0131) (0.0127) (0.0181) (0.0166)
Automatic 0.155*** 0.143*** 0.163*** 0.173***
(0.0361) (0.0395) (0.0501) (0.0511)
y2003 -0.0684*** -0.0759*** -0.0328 -0.0293
(0.0254) (0.0257) (0.0344) (0.0336)
y2004 -0.125*** -0.132*** -0.0924** -0.0927***
(0.0265) (0.0273) (0.0366) (0.0353)
y2005 -0.208*** -0.218*** -0.174*** -0.163***
(0.0251) (0.0268) (0.0342) (0.0346)
y2006 -0.149*** -0.159*** -0.125*** -0.115***
(0.0256) (0.0280) (0.0354) (0.0363)
y2007 -0.268*** -0.273*** -0.305*** -0.278***
(0.0258) (0.0251) (0.0355) (0.0355)
y2008 -0.290*** -0.300*** -0.326*** -0.289***
(0.0246) (0.0257) (0.0331) (0.0381)
Constant -0.580* -0.410 -0.868* -0.894*
(0.346) (0.462) (0.522) (0.519)
Observations 236 236 236 236
R2 0.881 0.888 0.781 0.794
Notes: This table presents hedonic price function IV estimation results using
petrol hatchbacks for years 2002 to 2008. To analyze sensitivity of results,
we present four different specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses,
***p   0.01, **p   0.05, *p   0.1.
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Table 2.5: Hedonic Price Function IV Estimation Results–Diesel Hatchback
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price)
City Fuel Economy 0.0734*** 0.0873*** 0.0633*** 0.0830***
(0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0192) (0.0193)
Weight 1.308*** 1.180*** 0.784*** 0.753***
(0.158) (0.189) (0.175) (0.188)
Power Ratio 6.721*** 5.412***
(1.189) (1.335)




Luxury Index 0.0376*** 0.0385*** 0.0392*** 0.0399***
(0.00688) (0.00727) (0.00671) (0.00713)
Safety Index 0.000191 -0.0131 0.000624 -0.0158
(0.0141) (0.0156) (0.0139) (0.0154)
Automatic 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
y2003 -0.0575** -0.0651** -0.0617** -0.0700**
(0.0293) (0.0311) (0.0290) (0.0310)
y2004 -0.150*** -0.150*** -0.146*** -0.147***
(0.0291) (0.0305) (0.0286) (0.0302)
y2005 -0.0905** -0.0672* -0.0990** -0.0682*
(0.0392) (0.0404) (0.0392) (0.0408)
y2006 -0.000269 0.0391 -0.0132 0.0384
(0.0432) (0.0453) (0.0432) (0.0459)
y2007 -0.144*** -0.0991** -0.156*** -0.0978**
(0.0408) (0.0437) (0.0413) (0.0445)
y2008 -0.236*** -0.169*** -0.257*** -0.168***
(0.0413) (0.0493) (0.0440) (0.0517)
Constant -1.091*** -1.281*** -0.260 -0.695*
(0.351) (0.353) (0.384) (0.390)
Observations 64 64 64 64
R2 0.851 0.836 0.856 0.839
Notes: This table presents hedonic price function IV estimation results using
diesel hatchbacks for years 2002 to 2008. To analyze sensitivity of results, we
present four different specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses, ***p  
0.01, **p   0.05, *p   0.1.
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Table 2.6: Hedonic Price Function IV Estimation Results–Petrol Sedan
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price)
City Fuel Economy 0.0484** 0.0597*** 0.0699** 0.0843***
(0.0220) (0.0197) (0.0306) (0.0304)
Weight 1.355*** 0.914*** 0.828*** 0.742***
(0.112) (0.138) (0.138) (0.137)
Power Ratio 5.984*** 3.344***
(0.863) (0.960)




Luxury Index 0.0513*** 0.0453*** 0.0471*** 0.0437***
(0.00481) (0.00443) (0.00509) (0.00508)
Safety Index 0.0117 0.0159* 0.0198* 0.0264**
(0.00965) (0.00886) (0.0111) (0.0110)
Automatic 0.108*** 0.0513 0.0785 0.0614
(0.0407) (0.0397) (0.0484) (0.0479)
y2003 -0.0256 -0.0192 -0.0114 -0.00107
(0.0292) (0.0268) (0.0335) (0.0332)
y2004 -0.149*** -0.159*** -0.147*** -0.149***
(0.0270) (0.0251) (0.0301) (0.0298)
y2005 -0.228*** -0.222*** -0.204*** -0.191***
(0.0337) (0.0309) (0.0417) (0.0413)
y2006 -0.266*** -0.261*** -0.275*** -0.258***
(0.0281) (0.0258) (0.0304) (0.0303)
y2007 -0.304*** -0.280*** -0.314*** -0.276***
(0.0269) (0.0247) (0.0290) (0.0297)
y2008 -0.391*** -0.361*** -0.407*** -0.362***
(0.0291) (0.0270) (0.0306) (0.0315)
Constant -0.450 -0.512 -0.176 -0.529
(0.356) (0.325) (0.417) (0.418)
Observations 216 216 216 216
R2 0.905 0.919 0.897 0.899
Notes: This table presents hedonic price function IV estimation results using
petrol sedans for years 2002 to 2008. To analyze sensitivity of results, we present
four different specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses, ***p   0.01,
**p   0.05, *p   0.1.
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Table 2.7: Hedonic Price Function IV Estimation Results–Diesel Sedan
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price)
City Fuel Economy 0.0973** 0.0398* 0.103*** 0.0447**
(0.0383) (0.0210) (0.0272) (0.0177)
Weight 1.856*** 1.146*** 1.843*** 0.677**
(0.447) (0.271) (0.470) (0.338)
Power Ratio 1.557 7.269***
(3.573) (2.091)




Luxury Index 0.0367*** 0.0418*** 0.0362*** 0.0411***
(0.0104) (0.00792) (0.0101) (0.00751)
Safety Index -0.000268 -0.0208 0.000541 -0.0255
(0.0240) (0.0195) (0.0237) (0.0189)
Automatic 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
y2003 0.145 -0.0165 0.158* -0.0190
(0.113) (0.0727) (0.0920) (0.0672)
y2004 0.0308 -0.128* 0.0419 -0.140**
(0.111) (0.0720) (0.0925) (0.0677)
y2005 0.0848 -0.126 0.102 -0.128*
(0.140) (0.0843) (0.109) (0.0767)
y2006 0.136 -0.0898 0.154 -0.0976
(0.149) (0.0889) (0.117) (0.0820)
y2007 0.0714 -0.161* 0.0900 -0.164**
(0.152) (0.0903) (0.117) (0.0818)
y2008 0.0119 -0.230** 0.0318 -0.228***
(0.162) (0.0965) (0.122) (0.0859)
Constant -1.578* -0.462 -1.597** 0.0221
(0.831) (0.475) (0.799) (0.527)
Observations 42 42 42 42
R2 0.914 0.943 0.909 0.947
Notes: This table presents hedonic price function IV estimation results using
diesel sedans for years 2002 to 2008. To analyze sensitivity of results, we present
four different specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses, ***p   0.01,
**p   0.05, *p   0.1.
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Table 2.8: OLS and IV Hedonic Price Function City Fuel Economy Coefficients
(1) (2) (3) (4) Observations
Petrol hatchback
OLS 0.0144** 0.000870 0.0128 0.00381 244
(0.00673) (0.00739) (0.00776) (0.00860)
IV 0.0316* 0.0155 0.0935*** 0.0899*** 236
(0.0179) (0.0302) (0.0314) (0.0285)
Diesel hatchback
OLS 0.0358*** 0.0363*** 0.0281** 0.0292*** 64
(0.0107) (0.0103) (0.0110) (0.0104)
IV 0.0734*** 0.0873*** 0.0633*** 0.0830*** 64
(0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0192) (0.0193)
Petrol sedan
OLS 0.0472*** 0.0442*** 0.0264** 0.0260** 411
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0106)
IV 0.0484** 0.0597*** 0.0699** 0.0843*** 216
(0.0220) (0.0197) (0.0306) (0.0304)
Diesel sedan
OLS 0.0137 0.0273*** 0.00866 0.0239** 158
(0.0103) (0.00983) (0.0112) (0.0107)
IV 0.0973** 0.0398* 0.103*** 0.0447** 42
(0.0383) (0.0210) (0.0272) (0.0177)
Notes: This table presents OLS and IV fuel economy coefficient estimates for all four hedonic price
function specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses, ***p   0.01, **p   0.05, *p   0.1.
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Table 2.9: Fuel Economy Premium vs. Present Discounted Value of Fuel Savings
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Petrol hatchback
FE Premium 42600 38600 36800 35300 37500
[14400, 70800] [13400, 63700] [13500, 60000] [12800, 57800] [13500, 61500]
PDV of fuel savings
r  0.15, constant pf 16675 17980 21022 21850 23087
r  0.15, increasing pf 20972 22310 25680 26404 27579
r  0.10, constant pf 21278 22943 26824 27881 29460
r  0.10, increasing pf 27779 29495 33873 34772 36256
Diesel hatchback
FE Premium 40800 41400 38100 35300 42500
[22200, 59400] [21500, 61300] [19800, 56400] [20800, 51700] [24800, 60300]
PDV of fuel savings
r  0.15, constant pf 16405 16050 17918 25691 27174
r  0.15, increasing pf 23160 22129 23984 33322 34801
r  0.10, constant pf 20933 20480 22864 32782 34674
r  0.10, increasing pf 31155 29678 32042 44328 46215
Petrol sedan
FE Premium 77100 79400 74700 65300 68500
[19900, 134000] [21600, 137000] [19300, 130000] [19000, 112000] [18000, 114000]
PDV of fuel savings
r  0.15, constant pf 30863 34722 37241 43735 45093
r  0.15, increasing pf 38816 43085 45494 52851 53866
r  0.10, constant pf 39382 44306 47520 55807 57540
r  0.10, increasing pf 51415 56960 60008 69600 70814
Diesel sedan
FE Premium 45500 35400 33200 31600 35400
[11600, 79500] [11000, 59800] [9590, 56800] [10300, 53000] [10700, 60000]
PDV of fuel savings
r  0.15, constant pf 16393 21130 21259 28381 27294
r  0.15, increasing pf 23143 29133 28456 36812 34954
r  0.10, constant pf 20918 26962 27127 36215 34827
r  0.10, increasing pf 31132 39072 38017 48971 46418
Notes: FE premium results are based on hedonic price function IV estimates presented
in Tables 2.4-2.7 (specification 4). Delta method 95% confidence intervals are presented
in brackets. All values are in 2008 Rupees. Present discounted value of fuel savings is
calculated using vehicle survival probability and declining annual driving distances
discussed in text. Calculations are presented for interest rates of 15% and 10% as well as
constant pf and increasing pf .
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Table 2.10: Differences between Petrol and Diesel Twins in Price and Fuel Economy
Hatchback Sedan
VARIABLES ln(Price) ln(City FE) ln(Price) ln(City FE)
Diesel 0.0945*** 0.271*** 0.0767*** 0.301***
(0.0210) (0.00921) (0.00988) (0.00853)
Constant 1.51*** 2.37*** 2.47*** 2.15***
(0.00819) (0.00361) (0.00475) (0.00390)
Model-Year Dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 343 314 689 579
R2 0.815 0.895 0.989 0.909
Notes: This table presents regression results using all available petrol and diesel hatch-
back and sedan twins for years 2002 to 2008. Standard errors are in parentheses,
***p   0.01, **p   0.05, *p   0.1.










Price 105 Rupees 2008 4.61 4.84 12.0 12.7
(0.938) (0.758) (10.9) (9.35)
Weight 1000 kilograms 0.957 0.991 1.15 1.22
(0.101) (0.0950) (0.198) (0.170)
Power Ratio horsepower/kilogram 0.0761 0.0603 0.0896 0.0658
(0.00755) (0.00900) (0.0168) (0.0175)
Engine Size cubic centimeters 1280 1570 1680 1800
(169) (220) (370) (320)
Torque kilogram-meters 10.7 10.8 15.0 18.0
(1.67) (2.85) (4.65) (8.40)
CityFuel Economy kilometers/liter 10.1 13.1 8.75 11.6
(0.995) (1.12) (1.22) (1.69)
Luxury Index 2.82 2.48 5.04 5.33
(1.53) (1.47) (2.55) (2.57)
Safety Index 0.730 0.781 1.40 1.49
(0.647) (0.766) (1.41) (1.38)
Automatic 0.000 0.000 0.133 0.127
(0.000) (0.000) (0.341) (0.334)
# of versions 74 64 210 150
Notes: The unweighted average across all available twin hatchback and sedan version is presented
above with standard deviations in parentheses.
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Hatchback Sedan SUV/MUV Van
Petrol Diesel
Source: Author’s calculations based on annual vehicle sales data from SIAM and the J.D.
Power APEAL survey
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Figure 2.2: 95% Confidence Intervals of Fuel Economy Premium Minus Present Dis-




































petrol hatchback diesel hatchback petrol sedan diesel sedan 
Notes: The graph presents 95% confidence intervals of hedonic price function specification
4 estimates of the price of a 1 kpl improvement in fuel economy minus the associated
present discounted value of fuel savings, calculated using a 15% discount rate. Fuel prices
are expected to remain constant over the life of the vehicle.
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Figure 2.3: 95% Confidence Intervals of Fuel Economy Premium Minus Present Dis-




































petrol hatchback diesel hatchback petrol sedan diesel sedan 
Notes: The graph presents 95% confidence intervals of hedonic price function specification
4 estimates of the price of a 1 kpl improvement in fuel economy minus the associated
present discounted value of fuel savings, calculated using a 10% discount rate. Fuel prices
are expected to increase by 2 Rs. per year over the life of the vehicle.
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Chapter 3
Policy Responses Dieselization in the Indian Car Market
3.1 Introduction
Since the sweeping economic reforms of 1991, the Indian car market has grown
at an average rate of 15% per year.1 Recent years have seen even more dramatic
growth with 2010 sales exceeding the previous year’s by 32%. During this same
period of rising incomes, economic growth, and increasing demand, the market has
experienced dieselization, the increasing market share of diesel cars. Driven by
consumers’ strong preference for low operating cost vehicles, the market share of
diesel cars has risen from 23% in 2002 to 40% in 2010.
With increased mobility, has come increased foreign oil dependence, fuel con-
sumption, and associated externalities. Although the Indian government has re-
sponded to transportation-related pollution with fuel quality standards, emissions
standards, and is now contemplating fuel economy standards, their continued sub-
sidization of diesel fuel may be undermining these efforts.2 Table 3.1 presents emis-
1I use 1991 as a demarcation between pre-liberalization and post-liberaliztion periods because
of the magnitude of the changes ocurring in and and around that year and its prevelance as a focal
point in the literature. Alternative demarcations specific to the automotive industry include 1983,
the initial year of collaboration between state owned Maruti Udyog and Japanese firm Suzuki, and
1993, the year the passenger car market was delicensed. See Panagariya (2008) for a more thorough
and nuanced discussion of liberalization and see Ranawat and Tiwari (2009) for its implications
for the Indian car market.
2I use subsidy as a catch-all for the differential policy treatment of petrol and diesel fuels and
its impact on retail prices. The major component of the difference is diesel’s lower rate of excise
taxation, but other interventions play an important role as well. A full discussion of the politics
and mechanics of price control is beyond the scope of this chapter, but see Chaturvedi (2008) and
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sions factors estimates for various pollutants (Baidya and Borken-Kleefeld, 2009)
along with their associated health consequences (Central Pollution Control Board,
2010). The emissions factors indicate that although diesel cars are less pollution
intensive for HC (hydrocarbons) and CO2 (carbon dioxide), they are far worse for
NOx (nitrous oxides), PM (particulate matter), and SO2 (sulphur dioxide).3
The policy objectives of petroleum pricing are clear: provide kerosene to the
poor for lighting, incentivize household use of natural gas and kerosene over firewood
and dung, insulate the economy from oil shocks, and promote financial viability of
domestic oil companies to minimize reliance on imports (Parikh, 2010). Recently,
however, greater attention has been paid to the unintended consequences of market
intervention. In addition to dieselization of the car market, these include the use of
trucks for freight transport instead of far more efficient trains, adulteration of diesel
fuel with kerosene, fuel shortages, and financial losses for state-owned and private
oil companies alike.4 In light of the economic and social consequences of diesel subsi-
dization, a 2010 report from The Expert Group on a Viable and Sustainable System
of Pricing of Petroleum Products recommended that petrol and diesel fuel prices
Parikh (2010) for further detail.
3Note, however, that the emissions factors shown are in grams per kilometer. As discussed
below, diesel cars are significantly cheaper to drive and are thus driven more, attenuating any
pollution benefits of dieselization and exacerbating its harmful environmental and public health
consequences.
4This is the short list. In 2008, Reliance and Essar, India’s largest private fuel retailers, col-
lectively closed over 2, 500 fueling stations (Kulshrestha, 2010); because private companies were
ineligible to benefit from oil bonds and other financing schemes, their operations had become un-
profitable. A 2005 report from the National Council of Applied Economic Research found that as
much as 38% of subsidized kerosene winds up on the black market (NCAER, 2005). Shenoy (2010)
makes the assertion that black market money is entwined with the political process, funding the
campaigns of corrupt officials. On November 19, 2005, 27 year old Shanmughan Manjunath, a
marketing manager for the Indian Oil Corporation, was murdered by fuel station owner Pawan
Kumar Mittal for his role in disrupting the latter’s adulteration scheme. It is not the only murder
to result from attempted interference with the subsidy-induced black market (The Hindu, 2011).
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“be market determined both at the refinery gate and retail levels.” While stopping
short of advocating for an end to diesel subsidization, the group recommended “an
additional excise duty on a diesel vehicle corresponding to the differential tax on
the petrol should be levied.”
This chapter compares the diesel car tax recommendation of the Expert Com-
mittee to a diesel fuel tax. I present a structural econometric analysis of the market
for new cars and simulations of market responses to these alternative regimes. Using
data from the JD Power APEAL survey, I model the joint decision of which car to
buy and how much to drive it in a mixed logit discrete-continuous choice framework.
The model accounts for unobserved vehicle characteristics by including body type
and manufacturer-specific constants and household heterogeneity by allowing pref-
erences to reflect demographics and to be distributed according to sensible random
distributions. Because car choice and car use decisions are determined by a com-
mon set of simultaneously estimated, randomly distributed parameters, the model
accounts for correlation that might otherwise result in biased parameter estimates
and behavioral predictions.
I estimate the model separately for years 2006, 2008, and 2010 and simulate
the demand-side response for each of these three years. In each year, I consider the
effect of a diesel fuel tax that would result in equalizing the price of petrol and diesel
fuel. I then simulate the effects of a diesel car tax that would result in the same
reduction in the market share of diesel cars. Finally, a smaller diesel fuel tax that
would result in the same total fuel savings as the diesel car tax is considered.
For each policy, I simulate changes in market shares, driving distances, and
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total fuel use. I compare the relative efficiency of each policy by calculating compen-
sating variation, government revenue, and deadweight loss per liter of fuel conserved.
For these calculations, I assume the difference between diesel and petrol prices is
entirely the result of a pre-existing tax on petrol. I further assume that there is no
petrol car tax. Because the JD Power survey is conditional on purchasing a new
car, I can not model the extent to which total vehicle sales would change and thus
all estimates are conditional on total vehicle sales.
In 2006, for example, a 44.5% diesel fuel tax would eliminate the disparity
between diesel and petrol prices and reduce the market share of diesel cars from
28.3% to 23.7%. To achieve the same market share outcome, a diesel car tax of
24.5% would be necessary. The diesel car tax, however, would reduce total fuel
consumption by only 1.50% compared to 9.11% for the 44.5% diesel fuel tax. A
5.60% diesel fuel tax would have the same total fuel conservation effect as the diesel
car tax. The deadweight loss per liter of fuel conserved is much lower for diesel
fuel taxation than diesel car taxation. In fact, at the 5.60% diesel fuel tax level,
deadweight loss per liter is negative. Because the pre-existing tax on petrol fuel is
much higher than the proposed tax on diesel fuel, would-be diesel buyers, who are
compelled to buy a petrol car instead, generate more government revenue (through
their consumption of petrol fuel) than would be necessary to compensate them to
their pre-tax utility levels.
These results are fairly consistent across years. In terms of total fuel con-
servation, a diesel fuel tax sufficient to equalize diesel and petrol fuel prices is the
most effective. While this subsidy eliminating diesel fuel tax and the diesel car tax
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are similar in terms of compensating variation, and government revenue raised, the
diesel fuel tax is superior in terms of deadweight loss per liter of fuel conserved in all
years. The negative deadweight loss result discussed above for 2006 is also persistent
across years 2008 and 2010.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a back-
ground discussion of dieselization in India. Section 3.3 provides an overview of the
economics of discrete-continuous choice. Section 3.4 presents details on the data
used and the stylized facts of Indian cars and the people who buy them. Section 3.5
presents the model, its econometric implementation, and estimation results. Section
3.7 discusses the results of policy simulations and section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 The Environmental Impact of Diesel Cars
A recent report on vehicular pollution control (Central Pollution Control
Board, 2010) finds that road vehicle related pollution accounts for “70% of CO, 50%
of HC, 30–40% of NOx, 30% of SPM and 10% of SO2” in India’s major metropoli-
tan areas. While the majority of privately owned, non-commercial vehicles, and
the major contributor to road vehicle pollution, is comprised of two-wheelers, re-
cent studies suggest that the gap between car and motorcycle ownership is quickly
closing. Dargay et al. (2007) project continued growth of the car market could lead
to a car ownership rate of 110 cars per 1000 people by 2030, up from just 16 cars
per 1000 people in 2010. Another recent study (Arora et al., 2011), which projects
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similar car ownership rates, projects an increase in the ratio of cars to two-wheelers
from approximately 1:4 to approximately 1:2 over the same time period.
The growing contribution of cars, relative to two-wheelers, to the environmen-
tal and public health consequences of transportation related externalities is com-
pounded by the fuel economy disparity that exists between the two vehicle types.
Estimates from de la Rue du Can et al. (2009) indicate that average fuel economy
in 2005 was 12.8 kilometers per liter for petrol cars, 14.0 kilometers per liter for
diesel cars, and 67.5 kilometers per liter for two-wheelers. They further project that
the gradual displacement of two-stroke engine two-wheelers by four-stroke engine
two-wheelers will lead to an average fuel economy of 75.0 kilometer per liter by
2020; petrol and diesel car fuel economy is projected to stagnate at 14.0 and 14.5
kilometers per liter, respectively.5
Dieselization also compounds the impact of cars on India’s environment.6 A
5The efficiency gap is, to some extent, offset by cars’ greater occupancy. de la Rue du Can
et al. (2009) estimate an average occupancy of 1.50 for two-wheelers and 3.18 for cars. Thus, if
passenger-kilometers per liter is a more appropriate metric of efficiency than kilometers per liter,
the gap is not so dramatic as indicated above.
6This is as good a place as any to note that dieselization is not a uniquely Indian phenomenon.
A recent study of 10 European Union countries (Ajanovic, 2011) documents the ubiquity of fuel
price disparities due to differential taxation. The extent to which petrol taxes exceed diesel taxes
ranges from 10% in the United Kingdom to 47% in the Netherlands. The authors find diesel cars’
share of the new car market increased from 10% in 1980 to 55% in 2007 while their share of the
existing stock of cars went from 4% to 32% over the same time period. In the United States,
one of the few OECD countries in which petrol and diesel are taxed equally, diesel cars represent
just 3% of new car sales, but August 2011 sales were 20.4% higher than August 2010 sales. J.D.
Power & Associates projects that diesel cars will account for 7.4% of sales by 2017 (PR Newswire,
2011). Dieselization is not universal, however. China, the world’s biggest car market, has suffered
diesel shortages in recent years and imposes restrictions on the sale and use of diesel fuel. Of the
7 million cars sold in 2009, only 10, 000 were diesels (Industry News, 2010). Industry executives
have expressed skepticism over the prospect of dieselization in China. Ian Roberston, BMW’s head
of sales and marketing, has asserted that China is more likely to see increasing hybrid sales than
diesel sales (Jolly, 2010) and Daimler CEO Dieter Zetsche believes electric vehicles are China’s
only realistic option: “If you look at the population and the growth here, you quickly reach the
conclusion that it would be unthinkable to provide these people with traditional gasoline- and
diesel-powered vehicles. There just isn’t enough oil for that.”
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recent study of air quality in Delhi (Narain and Krupnick, 2007) finds that an
increasing proportion of diesel cars has led to higher PM10 and NO2 concentrations
and lower CO and SO2 concentrations.7 As the authors point out, however, the
SO2 finding largely reflects Delhi’s exceptionally stringent fuel quality standards.
Thus, the empirical deviation from a priori expectations based on typical emissions
factors estimates (see Table 3.1) are unlikely to be representative of environmental
consequences of dieselization nationwide.
Previous research (Kathuria, 2002), using less recent and less detailed data
than Narain and Krupnick (2007), found that environmental policies, including pas-
senger vehicle emissions standards, did not have a significant impact on air quality.
The author concludes that emissions standards targeting new cars is insufficient
and that although in-use vehicle inspection is mandatory, the quality and integrity
of inspection procedures is questionable. This conclusion appears to fit well with
the findings of Narain and Krupnick (2007) who find fuel quality standards to have
a much stronger effect on air quality than emissions standards. In the context of
dieselization, the implications of these findings strongly favor diesel subsidy elimi-
nation over diesel car taxation.
3.2.2 What Drives Dieselization?
Dieselization is a dynamic process, the subtleties of which are not fully cap-
tured by the model presented here. A fully dynamic model would necessarily include,
7Studies of dieselization of the European car fleet find dieselization to be associated with an
increase in CO2 emissions in Spain (Gonzalez et al., 2011), and a decrease in energy use in a
cross-section of 10 European Union countries (Ajanovic, 2011).
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among other things, the introduction of new models in response to patterns of con-
sumer demand and the response of consumer demand to the introduction of new
models. In 2002, 25 diesel models were available while only 13 sold in significant
numbers. By 2008, 48 models were available, 24 of which sold in significant num-
bers.8 The findings presented here, therefore, should not be interpreted as the effect
of diesel subsidization on dieselization, but instead as the effect of removing diesel
subsidization conditional on a significant portion of the dynamic process having al-
ready unfolded. Figure 3.1 illustrates how dieselization breaks down across vehicle
categories. As relatively few diesel hatchbacks are available, due to technological
constraints, diesel models’ share of the hatchback market has remained between 10%
and 20%. In the sedan market, however, the share of diesel cars has increased from
10% in 2002 to nearly 45% in 2010. Sales of India’s biggest cars, its SUVs, MUVs,
trucks, and vans, have also been increasingly dominated by diesel models; in 2002
65% were diesels, by 2010 81% were.9
So why are people buying diesels? As discussed below, I find operating cost
to be a key determinant of vehicle choice. Although diesel cars are generally more
expensive, their lower operating cost more than offsets the purchase price difference
(Chugh et al., 2011). The diesel subsidy has resulted in a diesel discount of 30%,
relative to petrol, compounding diesel cars’ operating cost advantage due to their
approximately 30% higher fuel economy.
8Availability is based on appearance in the magazine AutoCar India, sales are based on the
J.D. Power APEAL survey.
9The categorization of passenger vehicles as hatchbacks, sedans, and SUVs is based on body
type classifications from carwale.com, a website geared toward Indian car buyers.
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3.3 Discrete-Continuous Choice
I model the purchase and use of new cars in a discrete-continuous choice frame-
work. The method, pioneered by Dubin and McFadden (1984), provides a tractable,
theoretically motivated approach to dealing with selection bias and has become a
workhorse model in energy demand estimation.10 The key insight of their study
is that if consumers with high expected electricity usage select into low operating
cost appliances, a simple regression of usage on operating cost will result in a biased
estimate of the price responsiveness of electricity demand. By directly modeling
the discrete choice of which appliance to purchase, the authors develop a selection
correction method and recover unbiased elasticity estimates in a second stage.
This two-stage approach has been applied to the United States car market
in several studies. In Goldberg (1998) the author uses a model of vehicle choice
and utilization, coupled with an oligopolistic model of supply, to study the effect
of CAFE standards on car sales, prices, and fuel consumption. West (2004) fol-
lows a similar approach and considers a broader range of policies and studies their
distributional effects.
One drawback of the two-stage approach is that separate estimation of car
choice and car use leads to two sets of model parameters, often differing in mag-
nitude and sign. As the model is derived using Roy’s Identity in a static utility
maximization framework, theoretical consistency requires a single set of parameters
to determine both choices. This is especially important in calculating the welfare im-
10But see Brand (2005) and Economides et al. (2008) for discrete-continuous models of the health
insurance and phone service markets, respectively.
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pact of policy intervention. Recent contributions from Feng et al. (2005) and Bento
et al. (2009) have sought to overcome this limitation by introducing simultaneous
estimation techniques.
Feng et al. (2005) consider the choice between cars and SUVs and present a
minimum distance method of simultaneous estimation. The authors make use of a
mixed logit model of vehicle choice in which preference distributions depend on a
single random taste shock. Bento et al. (2009) present an ambitious model of the
car market that includes new, used, and scrap markets to explore the distributional
impact of gasoline taxation. The authors employ a Bayesian estimation procedure
to recover model parameters of a mixed logit model allowing all coefficients to be
randomly distributed.
Spiller (2011) and Gillingham (2010) introduce further innovations to the
single-stage estimation literature. Spiller (2011) explores the effect of model aggre-
gation and unobserved vehicle attributes on gasoline demand elasticity estimates.
The author further allows for allocation of vehicle miles traveled across vehicles
in multi-car households. Gillingham (2010) presents a two period model in which
household expectations of fuel prices and driving needs are updated over time.
My approach incorporates these recent modeling and estimation advances,
subject to data limitations, in a mixed logit discrete-continuous choice model of
which car to buy and how much to drive it. I incorporate body type and manufac-
turer fixed effects to account for unobserved vehicle characteristics and randomly
distributed parameters to account for unobserved household characteristics. The
model is estimated by full information maximum likelihood which leads to a single
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set of parameter estimates, allowing for theoretically consistent welfare estimates.
3.4 Data
Household car choice and monthly driving distance data come from the JD
Power APEAL survey, an annual survey of approximately 5, 000 new car buyers.
Car characteristics data come from the magazine AutoCar India. Most car models
are available in multiple versions, some of which may be petrol versions while others
are diesel. This level of detail is available in AutoCar India, but survey respondents
are associated with a model/fuel-type only. Car characteristics for each model/fuel-
type are constructed as the unweighted average across all model versions of each
fuel type. Tables 3.2-3.4 present sales-weighted summary statistics for all vehicle
models sold in years 2006, 2008, and 2010. Price and fuel economy variables are
taken as the average across all respondents for each model/fuel-type, but are found
to be similar to price and fuel economy reported in AutoCar India.
It is important to note that within-body type differences across fuel types are
influenced by the difference in model availability across fuel types. For hatchbacks
and sedans every diesel model is available in petrol versions as well, but a wide
variety of petrol models are available for which there is no diesel counterpart. Thus
the differences observed in Tables 3.2–3.4 reflect model availability in addition to
inherent differences. Nevertheless, some stylized facts are noticeable. Diesel cars
are heavier than petrol cars, have a lower power to weight ratio, and, with the
exception of SUVs, have higher fuel economy. Petrol SUVs are dominated by the
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Maruti Omni, a niche van-like vehicle with no diesel counterpart.
Because of their higher fuel economy and cheaper fuel, diesel cars have lower
operating cost across body types. In 2006, diesel operating costs were 42% lower,
47% lower, and 28% lower for hatchbacks, sedans, and SUVs, respectively. In 2008,
operating cost differences were 39%, 45%, and 30%. In 2010, they were 34%, 38%,
and 18%. Predictably, the owners of lower operating cost vehicles drove more.
Tables 3.5–3.7 present summary statistics for household demographics. Averaged
over the three years considered, owners of diesel hatchbacks drove 69% more than
owners of petrol hatchbacks, owners of diesel sedans drove 35% more than owners
of petrol sedans, and owners of diesel SUVs drove 63% more than owners of petrol
SUVs.
Across all three years, sedan owners have higher incomes than hatchback own-
ers. Within these two body types, diesel owners generally have lower incomes than
petrol owners. Family sizes are slightly higher among diesel households and average
age of car owners is slightly lower. Family size also appears to be correlated with
vehicle size; in 2006, for example, average family size was 4.54, 4.73, and 5.48 for
petrol hatchbacks, petrol sedans, and petrol SUVs, respectively; a similar pattern
is seen for owners of diesel cars.
The data fall quite naturally into the model described below. Richer house-
holds buy more expensive cars, bigger families buy bigger cars, households with
greater driving needs buy lower operating cost vehicles. In the following section,




The household’s decision over which car to buy and how much to drive it
takes the form of a standard static utility maximization problem where utility is
some function of car characteristics, kilometers driven, and consumption of all other
goods. The household chooses the car that yields the highest indirect utility; optimal
driving distance can then be inferred by Roy’s Identity.
Although the survey is conducted in several locations across the country, I
model the new car market as a single, national market with the choice set being the
same for all households. Future work will relax this assumption and allow city- or
state-specific effects to influence vehicle purchase and driving distance decisions.11
As data are limited to households that have purchased a new car in the survey year,
the choice set does not include an outside good (such as a used car, motorcycle, or
public transportation). Thus, households in the model are faced with the decision
of which car to buy conditional on having already decided to buy a new car. This
modeling approach is necessary given data limitations, but also allows for a more
precise estimation of means and distributions of preferences for the subpopulation
of new car buyers (see Train and Winston (2007) for further discussion). However,
this restriction comes with some drawbacks. As consumers do not have the option of
not buying a car, the model will tend to underestimate own-price elasticities lead-
11Although fuel prices display little spatial variation in this time period, there are state-by-state
differences in vehicle taxes and registration fees that affect vehicle prices faced by consumers in
different markets. Furthermore, differences in terrain, weather, and road conditions affect operating
costs and other factors such as urban density and availability of public transportation could affect
driving distances. See Bento et al. (2005) for a study of urban spatial structure on mode choice
and driving distance.
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ing to exaggerated manufacturer markups when a supply side model is included.
Preliminary results from a supply side model with firms setting prices in a differen-
tiated Bertrand-Nash setting are sensible in some dimensions. Because the model
captures only the decision of which car to buy and not the decision of whether or
not to buy a car, however, markup estimates and production cost estimates are not
realistic. The results presented here assume no supply-side response. Future work
will explore means of avoiding these theoretical shortcomings using auxiliary data
and estimation of the choice of whether or not to buy a new car.
3.5.1 Vehicle Choice
Each household i chooses the car from the choice set J that yields the highest
utility. Following Bento et al. (2009), household i’s utility conditional on buying car
j is




eipj   ij (3.1)
where yi  rj is annual income of household i minus annualized rental cost of car
j, Xij is a vector of characteristics of car j, characteristics of household i, and
interactions of the two, pj is the per-kilometer operating cost of car j, and ij is
an i.i.d. stochastic preference shock.12 The coefficients, i, i, and i, are assumed
to follow uncorrelated random distributions, the parameters of which are to be
12As shown below, this functional form leads to a log-linear specification of the demand for
kilometers driven. Previous discrete-continuous models, including Dubin and McFadden (1984),




qeipj   ij which leads to a linear demand for kilometers driven equation. My research
makes use of the functional form in equation 3.1 because of its identifiability, ease of implementa-
tion, and prevalence in the more recent literature, though robustness of results to a priori equally
plausible functional forms is the subject of current investigation.
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estimated along with other parameters of the model. For example, i  ̄   i
where i is drawn from some distribution fp|!q. The ̄ and ! parameters are
estimated; other random parameters are treated analogously.
Let  represent the common set of coefficients such that
  t̄, ̄, ̄, !, !, !u. Individual parameters are then distributed according to
the joint probability density function gp|q. Then, letting ij have a type I extreme-









where  is the scale factor of the i.i.d. type I extreme-value error term.13
3.5.2 Driving Distance
Using Roy’s Identity, annual driving distance can be derived from equation 3.1
as follows:
KMij  Bvij{BpjBvij{Byi  e
ipyirjq iXij ipj . (3.3)
As the data consist of self-reported driving distances, I take the result of equation
3.3 to be predicted kilometers driven (zKM ij) and consider the difference between
predicted driving and reported driving (KMij) to be the result of measurement
13The extreme-value error term ij is distributed according to the probability density function
fpq  1e
{e{ with variance varpq  2 
2
6 . Since neither the level of utility nor the scale
of utility is identified,  can not be separately identified from the parameters when indirect utility
takes the more common linear functional form. However, because of the nonlinear way in which 
and  enter equation 3.1,  is identified.
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error.14 Specifically, I assume a multiplicative log-normal measurement error such
that KMij  zKM ijeij where ij  Np0, q. The reasoning behind this modeling
choice is that reported driving distance has a zero lower bound, but no upper bound.
Depending on the estimate of , this approach will result in driving distance pre-
dictions that are systematially lower than driving distance observations, a point I
return to in Section 3.6.1.
Taking account of the fact that the same randomly distributed coefficients that
determine vehicle choice probabilities also determine driving distance predictions,
the demand for kilometers driven equation becomes
logpKMijq 
»
ripyi  rjq   iXij   ipjs gp|qd   ij (3.4)
and the likelihood of observing KMij kilometers driven conditional on household i
buying car j is











where 1ij is an indicator function equal to 1 if household i bought car j and 0
otherwise.
14Future work will explore the possibility of modeling the difference between predicted and
reported driving distance as an idiosyncratic taste for driving that also affects vehicle choice by
including ij in the conditional indirect utility function. See Feng et al. (2005) and Gillingham
(2010) for examples of this approach.
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3.5.3 Rental and Operating Cost
To operationalize the model, it is necessary to convert the purchase price of a
vehicle to an annualized rental price and to construct a per-kilometer operating cost.
I focus entirely on the purchase price (inclusive of taxes) and calculate the rental
price as the annual payment on a car loan such that the loan would be paid back
over the expected life of the vehicle. Vehicle survival probabilities are based on a
survival curve for Indian cars estimated by Arora et al. (2011). Their survival curve
assumes a maximum vehicle life of 20 years and implies an expected vehicle life of 18
years. I use a nominal interest rate of 15%, based on interest rates charged on new
car loans in India and note that about 80% of new car purchases are financed with
such loans (Shankar, 2007; Carazoo.com, 2011; Seth, 2009). As inflation averaged
about 6% during this period, I use a real interest rate of 8.5% and present sensitivity
of results to alternative assumptions of 5 and 12% in the Appendix.
Operating cost is simply the Delhi fuel price divided by the fuel economy. As
with vehicle price, fuel economy is taken as the average self-reported fuel economy
for each vehicle type, but results are found to be robust to the use of AutoCar India
data vs. survey data. The Delhi prices of petrol and diesel fuel (in 2010 Rs.) were
61.4 and 42.5 in 2006, 54.2 and 37.8 in 2008, and 51.1 and 38.1 in 2010.
3.5.4 Estimation Strategy
Household i’s likelihood of buying the car it is observed to have bought and
driving the distance it is reported to have driven is simply the product of its likeli-
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hood of buying car j (equation 3.2) and its likelihood of driving KMij conditional on







rPrijℓpKMij|1ij  1qs1ij . (3.6)






1ijrlogpPrijq   logpℓpKMij|1ij  1qqs. (3.7)
Evaluating the log-likelihood function directly would require solving the integrals
of equations 3.2 and 3.3. In the absence of closed-form solutions, however, integra-
tion must be performed by simulation (Train, 2009). For any draw ir from the
distribution gp|q, the log-likelihood for household i is calculated, the sum of the
log-likelihoods from R separate draws is found, and the average is taken. In the
limit as R approaches infinity, the average car choice probabilities and conditional
driving distance likelihoods approach the true values. Finally, the log-likelihood to



















ℓpKMijr|1ij  1q. (3.10)
Results presented below are based on integrals simulated using 200 shifted
and shuffled Halton draws; a quasi-random scheme that provides better coverage
than pseudo-random draws. While some studies use up to 5000 pseudo-random
draws, Train (2000) finds that 100 Halton draws achieved greater accuracy than
1000 pseudo-random draws. In their recent study on the declining market share
of US car manufacturers, Train and Winston (2007) find 200 Halton draws to be
sufficient. I follow their approach to testing for sufficient draws by calculating the
value of the test statistic g1H1g using 400 draws and the parameter estimates
obtained using 200 draws. For the year 2006, I find a value of 1.25. Since “under
the null hypothesis that the gradient is zero, this test statistic is distributed chi-
squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number of parameters” (Train and
Winston, 2007), I fail to reject the hypothesis that the parameters found using 200
draws are indeed likelihood maximizing.
3.6 Results
The results presented here are for a specification including body type and man-
ufacturer fixed effects. All random coefficients, other than the income minus rental
cost (yi  rj) and operating cost (pj) coefficients, are assumed to be distributed
normally such that i Npbi , wq where the means are allowed to vary by house-
hold characteristics. The distribution of the income minus rental cost coefficient
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is assumed to be log-normal to reflect the positive marginal utility of consump-
tion of all other goods and the positive wealth effect on driving distance,   e
with  Npb, wq. Following the same reasoning, the distribution of the operat-
ing cost coefficient is assumed to be negative log-normal such that   ez with
z  Npb, wq.
Tables 3.8–3.10 present estimation results for all parameters including kilome-
ters driven measurement error () and scale factor (); manufacturer fixed effects
are not shown. Many coefficients are estimated at the 0.05 level or better and with
signs aligned with prior expectations and with estimates similar across years. There
are, however, some exceptions. The coefficient on luxury index, which is negative
in years 2006 and 2008, turns positive in 2010. The coefficient on power ratio is not
estimated with precision in years 2008 and 2010, but is found to be negative and
significant at the 0.10 level in 2006. Finally, the coefficients of size metrics length,
width, and height are not consistent across years. In 2006, the length coefficient is
negative while the width coefficient is positive with both being estimated at the 0.10
level of statistical significance; the height coefficient is not statistically significant
at conventional levels. In 2008, the length coefficient is again negative while the
height coefficient is positive and the width coefficient is not statistically significant.
In 2010, all three coefficients are negative and significant at the 0.01 level. These
coefficients are difficult to interpret, however, especially considering the inclusion of
body type indicators which show the expected preference for vehicle size.
Although the coefficients are difficult to interpret by themselves, some qual-
itative comparisons can be made. The fixed coefficients on interactions between
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family size and the hatchback dummy and sedan dummy indicate that larger fam-
ilies get less utility from smaller cars and drive less in them compared to smaller
families. Bigger families drive more than smaller ones, women drive less than men,
and driving distance decreases with age.
The coefficients on income minus rental cost and operating cost are estimated
precisely in all years, but their distributions are not. Recalling that the coefficient on
income minus rental cost is distributed log-normally, the mean elasticity of vehicle
kilometers traveled with respect to income can be shown to be 0.0375 for 2006, 0.147
for 2008, and 0.198 for 2010. Similarly, the mean elasticity of vehicle kilometers
traveled with respect to operating cost can be shown to be 1.03 for 2006, 1.03 for
2008, and 1.11 for 2010.
3.6.1 Model Fit
Figures 3.2-3.7 summarize the within-sample fit of the estimated model in
terms of market share and driving distance predictions. Aggregated to body- and
fuel-type categories, predicted market shares appear to match actual market shares
accurately. Figures 3.2, 3.4, and 3.6, however, mask the fact that model fit actually
detiorates over time. The sum of the absolute error of predicted market shares
across each model/fuel-type available in each year results in 11.6 percentage points
of total error for 2006, 26.4 for 2008, and 31.4 for 2010. Future work will explore
the possibility of improving model fit with different specifications for each year as
opposed to using the same specification for all years.
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The prediction of driving distance is more difficult to asses. Although Figures
3.3, 3.5, and 3.7 seem to indicate a systematic under-prediction of driving distance, it
is important to note that the model is based on the presence of a normally distributed
measurement error on the log of driving distance and not driving distance itself.
This implies that rather than the model under-predicting driving distance, it is the
survey respondents who systematically over-estimate their true driving distance. As
the bottom line results will be a function of actual driving distances and not reported
driving distance, it is important not to correct for the difference between predicted
driving and observed driving. The assumption of respondents over-estimating their
driving distance rests on the fact that while there is a zero lower bound for driving
distance reported, there is no upper bound. The estimated model implies that
people over-estimate their true driving distance by 26.2% in 2006, 25.5% in 2008,
and 54.0% in 2010. Whether or not this degree of over-estimation is realistic and
alternative modeling approaches that might avoid this conclusiong are the subject
of future investigation.
3.7 Policy Simulation
In this section, the estimated behavioral model is used to explore the market
and welfare implications of two possible policy responses to dieselization: diesel fuel
taxation and diesel car taxation. To compare these two very different policies, it is
necessary to to have some common objective in mind. I simulate the market share
of diesel cars under a diesel fuel tax that is sufficiently large to equalize the price of
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petrol and diesel fuel and search for the diesel car tax that would result in the same
market share. A second diesel fuel tax is then found that would result in the same
total fuel conservation as the diesel car tax. These comparisons are used to explore
the effects of the diesel fuel taxes and diesel car taxes on market share, driving
distance, fuel consumption, consumer welfare, and government revenue. Before
presenting results of this exercise, I present the technical details and assumptions
used.
3.7.1 Welfare Analysis
Because the structural approach taken here results in estimates of utility func-
tion parameters, I am able to perform welfare analyses of the two policy scenarios
being considered. I present money-metric welfare results in terms of consumers’
compensating variation (CV ), the minimum payment that would be necessary to
return the consumer to his pre-policy utility level. Compensating variation is im-
plicitly defined as follows:
max
jPJ
vipyi  r0j , p0j , Xij; i, tijq  max
kPJ
vipyi  r1k  cvt, p1k, Xik; i, tikq. (3.11)
Since the model used here is probabilistic, it is impossible to calculate exact welfare
estimates. Rather, a simulation procedure (McFadden, 1995) is used to find expected
compensating variation. The simulation algorithm is as follows.
1. At iteration t, draw a vector of indirect utility function errors tij and draws
from coefficient distributions it
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2. Solve for cvt according to equation 3.11
3. Repeat 1 and 2 until convergence. Mean and distribution of CV s can be taken
from collection of simulated CV s
Although approximation methods are available (Herriges and Kling, 1999), the
method used here is not prohibitively computationally intensive and results in a
distribution of possible welfare results for each individual. This makes possible the
evaluation of distributional implications.
3.7.2 Results
Comparisons of market outcomes and welfare results under the policy simula-
tions are presented in Tables 3.11–3.13. In 2006, a 44.5% diesel fuel tax is necessary
to equalize the price of petrol and diesel fuel. The result of this tax is found to
be a reduction of the market share of diesel cars from 28.3% to 23.7%. To achieve
the same market outcome, a diesel car tax of 24.5% would be necessary. In 2008, a
43.3% diesel fuel tax results in a reduction of the market share of diesel cars from
31.3% to 23.4% with a 23.3% tax on diesel cars being necessary to achieve this. In
2010, a 34.3% diesel fuel tax results in a reduction of the market share of diesel cars
from 32.4% to 23.8%. I find that a diesel car tax of only 17.8% would result in this
same market share reduction.
While a diesel fuel tax and a diesel car tax will induce some would-be diesel
buyers to opt for a petrol car instead, a diesel fuel tax affects the per-kilometer
driving cost and is found to have a greater effect on the driving behavior of those
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who choose to remain diesel car buyers. A diesel fuel tax sufficient to close the
petrol/diesel price gap has the effect of reducing diesel fuel consumption from 437
million liters to 270 million liters in 2006. Based on 2008, diesel fuel consumption
would be reduced from 540 million liters to 289 million liters. Based on 2010, the
reduction is from 836 million liters to 462 million liters. Diesel fuel consumption
reductions from diesel car taxation and a smaller diesel fuel tax are presented in
Tables 3.11–3.13. All policies would result in an increase in petrol fuel consumption
and so it is important to consider this effect when calculating changes in government
revnue and total fuel conservation.
Turning to welfare results, I find a 44.5% diesel fuel tax results in an average
CV of Rs. 27, 000 ($539) for would-be diesel car buyers based on 2006 results. A
24.5% diesel car tax results in an average CV of Rs. 27, 700 ($554) for would-be diesel
car buyers. This amounts to about 3.33% of annual income for the diesel fuel tax and
3.42% of annual income for diesel car taxation, but the distributional implications
are found to be regressive. Figure 3.8 shows the welfare effect on would-be diesel car
buyers of different income groups. I find a welfare burden of between 5 and 6% of
annual income for households of the lowest income category falling to less than 1%
for households of the highest income category. Based on 2008 results, average CV
for would-be diesel buyers is found to be Rs. 24, 200 ($484) from a 43.4% diesel fuel
tax and Rs. 25, 300 ($507) from diesel car taxation. Based on 2010 results, these
figures are Rs. 17, 300 ($345) from a 34.3% diesel fuel tax and Rs. 17, 600 ($352)
from the diesel car tax. For these two years, distributional consequences are found
to be similar to those discussed for 2006 (see Figures 3.9 and 3.10).
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In order to compare the relative efficiency of these policies, change in govern-
ment revenue is calculated and subtracted from the total CV to find deadweight
loss. Tables 3.11-3.13 present deadweight loss per liter of total fuel conserved and
intermediate calculations. In all years, the deadweight loss per liter of fuel conserved
from a diesel fuel tax that is sufficiently large to close the petrol/diesel fuel price gap
is less than that for the diesel car tax. Deadweight loss per liter from the subsidy
eliminating fuel tax is 80.6 Rs. in 2006, 72.7 Rs. in 2008, and 14.6 Rs. in 2010.
Deadweight loss per liter from the diesel car tax is 307 Rs. in 2006, 256 Rs. in
2008, and 208 Rs. in 2010. The lower deadweight loss in 2010 reflects the higher
sensitivity to changes in income in both the indirect utility and demand for driving
distance.
Deadweight loss per liter of fuel conserved is found to be lower for a diesel fuel
tax than a diesel car tax. In all years, in fact, the deadweight loss per liter of a
much smaller diesel fuel tax is found to be negative. This figure is 33.7 Rs./Liter in
2006, 18.9 Rs./Liter in 2008, and 57.3 Rs./Liter in 2010. This surprising result
comes from the fact that the pre-existing tax on petrol is assumed to equal the
total difference between petrol and diesel fuel prices while the proposed diesel fuel
tax is just a fraction of this difference. Thus, those would-be diesel car buyers who
are compelled to buy a petrol instead actually generate more government revenue
(through their petrol fuel consumption) than would be necessary to compensate
them back to their pre-tax utility levels. The result indicates that at low levels of
diesel fuel taxation, the decrease in relative distortions can be welfare enhancing
relative to the status quo in which only the petrol market is distorted by a tax.
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3.8 Conclusion
The Indian government is taking steps to mitigate the environmental conse-
quences of its rapid motorization. Driven by the policy objective of poverty alle-
viation, however, their continued subsidization of diesel fuel may be undermining
these efforts. In this chapter, I have presented a structural econometric discrete-
continuous choice model of vehicle purchasing decisions and driving behavior. Mar-
ket simulations indicate the effect of eliminating the petrol/diesel price gap with a
diesel fuel tax to be a modest reduction of the market share of diesel cars; a diesel car
tax of approximately 20% would achieve the same result based on separate analyses
of three years of market data. The diesel car tax option, however, does relatively
little to change intensive margin incentives and would result in a much smaller re-
duction of diesel fuel consumption. Both policies are found to have an expected
compensating variation effect of roughly 2–4% of household income on average, but
these results differ across income groups. Both policies impose substantially greater
costs on lower income households.
These two relatively extreme policies are contrasted to a small diesel fuel tax
of about 7%. The striking finding from these policy simulations is that deadweight
loss per liter of fuel conserved is actually negative; a result that is persistent across
years. This result arises due to the pre-existing tax on petrol fuel which is assumed
to equal the difference between petrol and diesel fuel prices. Because of this pre-
existing distortion, a small diesel fuel tax pushes some would-be diesel car buyers
into the market for petrols. The revenue raised from their consumption of petrol fuel
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more than offsets the CV necessary to restore them to their pre-tax utility levels.
While not captured in the model presented here, there are other margins along
which the two policies are likely to differ. Since fuel prices affect the operating cost
of all cars, not just new cars, the fuel consumption reduction advantage of diesel fuel
taxation would be vastly more dramatic than the results presented here. Diesel car
taxation would, of course, have an effect on the used car market too. For example,
if new diesel cars become more expensive due to taxation, owners of used diesel cars
may experience an increase in the value of this asset. If used diesel car owners are
relatively poorer than used petrol car owners, this result could reverse the relative
regressivity of diesel car taxation presented here.
In addition to exploring the issues raised in the previous paragraph, future
work will explore the possibility of modeling the decision of whether or not to buy a
new car. Due to data limitations, the present study is unable to quantify the market
size effects of policy intervention. While the results presented here are based on data
from 2006, 2008, and 2010, my data set includes survey and car data from years
2002 to 2010. Incorporating these observations into the model will almost certainly
result in better identification of price and operating cost responsiveness. Finally,
results presented here only include welfare effects on consumers of new cars; future
work will complete the picture by providing estimates of changes in manufacturer
profit.
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Affects the cardiovascular system; may also
particularly affect fetuses, sick, anemic and young
children; affects nervous system, impairing physical
coordination, vision and judgments, creating nausea
and headaches, reducing productivity and
increasing personal discomfort
HC 0.45 0.17 Potential to cause cancer
NOx 0.69 1.00
Increased susceptibility to infections, pulmonary
diseases; impairment of lung function and eye, nose
and throat irritations
PM 0.06 0.19
Fine particulate matter may be toxic in itself or
may carry toxic (including carcinogenic) trace
substance and can alter the immune system. Fine
particulates penetrate deep into the respiratory
system irritating lung tissue and causing long-term
disorders.
CO2 242 237
SO2 0.080 0.149 Affects lung function adversely
Source: Emissions factors are derived and reported by Baidya and Borken-Kleefeld
(2009), health effects are paraphrased from Central Pollution Control Board (2010).
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Price 105 Rupees (2010) 4.92 5.24 11.3 12.1 7.68 11.2
(1.27) (0.560) (4.49) (3.10) (7.49) (2.84)
Fuel Economy kilometers/liter 13.6 16.0 11.2 14.5 12.5 11.3
(2.86) (2.72) (2.41) (2.66) (3.13) (2.19)
Operating Cost 2010 Rupees/kilometer 4.72 2.76 5.74 3.04 5.31 3.90
(1.09) (0.678) (1.33) (0.621) (1.72) (0.775)
Engine Size cubic centimeters 1050 1410 1650 1650 1210 2500
(213) (0) (288) (248) (657) (124)
Power Ratio horsepower/kilogram 0.0729 0.0585 0.0930 0.0686 0.0610 0.0547
(0.0101) (0) (0.0117) (0.00890) (0.0230) (0.00814)
Torque kilogram-meters 8.75 9.91 14.4 18.4 10.3 21.2
(2.12) (0) (2.98) (3.10) (6.71) (4.23)
Gears 4.74 5.00 4.93 4.94 4.29 4.98
(0.360) (0) (0.145) (0.0928) (0.454) (0.0447)
Automatic 0.0692 0 0.175 0.0623 0.0939 0
(0.105) (0) (0.211) (0.0928) (0.196) (0)
Length meters 3.55 3.68 4.35 4.35 3.72 4.48
(0.141) (0) (0.194) (0.117) (0.553) (0.178)
Width meters 1.54 1.67 1.69 1.69 1.52 1.75
(0.0947) (0) (0.0587) (0.0304) (0.166) (0.0696)
Height meters 1.51 1.49 1.44 1.43 1.67 1.85
(0.0873) (0) (0.0484) (0.0368) (0.0441) (0.0816)
Ground Clearance meters 0.168 0.170 0.170 0.160 0.174 0.183
(0.00446) (0) (0.00875) (0.0179) (0.0154) (0.0125)
Weight 1000 kilograms 0.833 0.980 1.10 1.20 0.969 1.76
(0.125) (0) (0.151) (0.0897) (0.348) (0.190)
Safety Index 1.32 1 1.62 1.75 1.38 1.24
(0.440) (0) (0.784) (0.805) (0.783) (0.542)
Luxury Index 2.47 2.86 5.52 5.26 1.72 3.71
(1.26) (0) (1.37) (1.07) (2.94) (1.35)
#Observations 1551 175 1270 305 181 765
Notes: Version level vehicle characteristics data come from AutoCar India. Each model
is available in multiple versions. Model/fuel-type level vehicle characteristics are
constructed as the unweighted average across all available versions of each model for
each fuel type. The sales-weighted average of these is calculated for each vehicle
category. Price and fuel economy data are averaged over all JD Power APEAL survey
respondents that purchased each vehicle type. Luxury index is defined as the sum of the
dummy variables for air conditioning, power steering, central locking, power windows,
alloy wheels, leather seats, power mirrors, and CD player. Safety index is defined as the
sum of the dummy variables for airbags, rear seatbelts, antilock braking system, and
traction control.
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Price 105 Rupees (2010) 4.65 6.31 11.0 11.0 10.8 11.3
(1.10) (1.75) (4.88) (4.35) (9.26) (3.85)
Fuel Economy kilometers/liter 13.8 15.6 11.5 14.7 12.1 11.7
(2.62) (2.97) (2.60) (3.15) (3.17) (2.39)
Operating Cost 2010 Rupees/kilometer 4.08 2.52 4.98 2.70 4.80 3.36
(0.850) (0.561) (1.18) (0.663) (1.35) (0.699)
Engine Size cubic centimeters 1050 1370 1670 1610 1470 2460
(165) (77.7) (336) (314) (754) (153)
Power Ratio horsepower/kilogram 0.0711 0.0683 0.0916 0.0725 0.0715 0.0569
(0.0075) (0.0108) (0.0131) (0.0143) (0.0276) (0.0116)
Torque kilogram-meters 9.12 15.1 15.1 21.0 13.1 23.6
(1.88) (4.10) (3.34) (5.70) (7.80) (6.52)
Gears 4.78 5.00 4.97 4.97 4.64 5.00
(0.317) (0) (0.106) (0.0638) (0.720) (0)
Automatic 0.0852 0 0.194 0.0670 0.191 0
(0.119) (0) (0.238) (0.183) (0.243) (0)
Length meters 3.57 3.77 4.43 4.35 3.90 4.33
(0.154) (0.136) (0.193) (0.162) (0.580) (0.324)
Width meters 1.54 1.67 1.72 1.71 1.59 1.76
(0.0799) (0.0209) (0.0440) (0.0273) (0.2001) (0.0683)
Height meters 1.53 1.51 1.48 1.48 1.66 1.86
(0.0738) (0.0200) (0.0533) (0.0394) (0.0358) (0.0737)
Ground Clearance meters 0.168 0.167 0.171 0.161 0.173 0.185
(0.00693) (0.0124) (0.0105) (0.0139) (0.00953) (0.0142)
Weight 1000 kilogram 0.876 1.01 1.16 1.21 1.11 1.78
(0.126) (0.0442) (0.136) (0.125) (0.397) (0.181)
Safety Index 1.26 1.55 1.97 1.68 1.81 1.41
(0.327) (0.464) (0.817) (0.842) (0.951) (0.640)
Luxury Index 3.35 3.35 5.80 5.25 3.35 3.89
(1.33) (1.21) (1.66) (1.24) (3.81) (1.89)
#Observations 2005 434 1363 657 257 890
Notes: Version level vehicle characteristics data come from AutoCar India. Each model
is available in multiple versions. Model/fuel-type level vehicle characteristics are
constructed as the unweighted average across all available versions of each model for
each fuel type. The sales-weighted average of these is calculated for each vehicle
category. Price and fuel economy data are averaged over all JD Power APEAL survey
respondents that purchased each vehicle type. Luxury index is defined as the sum of the
dummy variables for air conditioning, power steering, central locking, power windows,
alloy wheels, leather seats, power mirrors, and CD player. Safety index is defined as the
sum of the dummy variables for airbags, rear seatbelts, antilock braking system, and
traction control.
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Price 105 Rupees (2010) 4.16 5.29 10.4 9.79 6.31 11.4
(1.32) (1.09) (4.78) (3.92) (7.51) (5.13)
Fuel Economy kilometers/liter 13.9 15.7 11.8 14.4 12.9 11.6
(2.94) (2.90) (2.58) (3.11) (2.58) (2.39)
Operating Cost 2010 Rupees/kilometer 3.85 2.52 4.53 2.78 4.14 3.40
(0.903) (0.575) (0.965) (0.663) (0.879) (0.650)
Engine Size cubic centimeters 1050 1310 1690 1590 1200 2460
(183) (61.7) (388) (296) (492) (240)
Power Ratio horsepower/kilogram 0.0733 0.0641 0.0979 0.0738 0.0684 0.0589
(0.00802) (0.00449) (0.0156) (0.0140) (0.0214) (0.0192)
Torque kilogram-meters 9.42 17.0 16.1 22.3 10.3 25.9
(2.05) (2.86) (4.62) (6.05) (5.18) (6.30)
Gears 4.78 5.00 4.98 5.03 4.76 5.03
(0.339) (0) (0.230) (0.247) (0.716) (0.0718)
Automatic 0.0718 0 0.186 0.0639 0.0544 0.0906
(0.135) (0) (0.202) (0.149) (0.123) (0.167)
Length meters 3.59 3.79 4.46 4.39 3.69 4.55
(0.214) (0.106) (0.206) (0.190) (0.397) (0.195)
Width meters 1.57 1.68 1.73 1.72 1.50 1.79
(0.0859) (0.0120) (0.0501) (0.0467) (0.143) (0.0626)
Height meters 1.55 1.52 1.48 1.48 1.72 1.87
(0.0723) (0.0395) (0.0472) (0.0317) (0.0750) (0.0841)
Ground Clearance meters 0.168 0.166 0.168 0.163 0.166 0.189
(0.00722) (0.0066) (0.0104) (0.0119) (0.00866) (0.0157)
Weight 1000 kilogram 0.896 1.11 1.19 1.25 0.971 1.81
(0.140) (0.0466) (0.169) (0.169) (0.263) (0.158)
Safety Index 1.28 1.24 2.30 2.09 1.33 1.75
(0.573) (0.446) (0.826) (0.834) (0.740) (0.742)
Luxury Index 3.31 3.41 6.11 5.74 1.45 4.88
(1.51) (1.06) (1.53) (1.37) (2.90) (2.09)
#Observations 2404 596 1176 730 233 1095
Notes: Version level vehicle characteristics data come from AutoCar India. Each model
is available in multiple versions. Model/fuel-type level vehicle characteristics are
constructed as the unweighted average across all available versions of each model for
each fuel type. The sales-weighted average of these is calculated for each vehicle
category. Price and fuel economy data are averaged over all JD Power APEAL survey
respondents that purchased each vehicle type. Luxury index is defined as the sum of the
dummy variables for air conditioning, power steering, central locking, power windows,
alloy wheels, leather seats, power mirrors, and CD player. Safety index is defined as the
sum of the dummy variables for airbags, rear seatbelts, antilock braking system, and
traction control.
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Income 105 Rupees p2010q 6.16 5.33 10.3 9.39 7.16 8.57
(4.84) (4.17) (6.96) (6.68) (6.39) (6.38)
Family Size 4.54 4.94 4.73 5.07 5.48 5.45
(1.57) (1.67) (1.48) (1.60) (1.82) (1.70)
Age years 37.5 34.6 37.4 35.8 36.4 36.9
(11.7) (9.53) (11.1) (10.9) (9.64) (9.84)
% Female 0.0825 0.0400 0.0488 0.0328 0.0332 0.0248
(0.275) (0.197) (0.216) (0.178) (0.180) (0.156)
Driving Distance kilometers/month 1140 2060 1340 2000 1480 2240
(1080) (1500) (1030) (1340) (1100) (1460)
#Observations 1551 175 1270 305 181 765
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Demographic information comes from the
2006 JD Power APEAL survey.
















Income 105 Rupees (2010) 5.93 6.09 8.68 7.87 7.27 7.45
(4.10) (3.96) (5.59) (5.35) (6.02) (5.16)
Family Size 4.73 4.97 4.87 5.06 5.33 5.48
(1.72) (1.67) (1.60) (1.61) (1.63) (1.98)
Age years 37.5 36.2 38.1 37.3 38.1 37.4
(11.3) (10.5) (10.8) (10.1) (10.7) (9.60)
% Female 0.0763 0.0369 0.0631 0.0198 0.0311 0.0236
(0.266) (0.189) (0.243) (0.139) (0.174) (0.152)
Driving Distance kilometers/month 1110 1770 1310 1710 1400 2080
(997) (1350) (1010) (1160) (1080) (1460)
#Observations 2005 434 1363 657 257 890
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Demographic information comes from the
2008 JD Power APEAL survey.
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Income 105 Rupees (2010) 5.29 5.29 7.78 6.66 5.35 7.01
(3.59) (3.50) (4.89) (4.26) (4.07) (4.56)
Family Size 4.73 4.93 5.06 5.15 5.56 5.43
(1.56) (1.49) (1.65) (1.59) (1.62) (1.61)
Age years 38.0 35.9 37.2 36.2 37.5 36.8
(11.4) (10.7) (10.4) (9.12) (10.0) (9.72)
% Female 0.0861 0.0319 0.0459 0.0384 0.0129 0.0265
(0.281) (0.176) (0.209) (0.192) (0.113) (0.161)
Driving Distance kilometers/month 1370 2210 1670 1960 1410 2600
(1960) (2550) (2560) (2090) (1550) (2770)
#Observations 2404 596 1176 730 233 1095
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Demographic information comes from the
2010 JD Power APEAL survey.
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Table 3.8: Demand Model Parameter Estimates—2006
(Standard
FIXED Coefficient Error)
Hatchback Dummy 0.00792* (0.00450)
Sedan Dummy 0.01466* (0.00816)
Age -0.00747*** (0.00118)
Female Dummy -0.244*** (0.0483)
Family Size 0.0743*** (0.00866)
Gears 0.00556* (0.00319)
Automatic -0.00110 (0.000901)
Safety Index 0.0000615* (0.000358)
Luxury Index -0.00104* (0.000612)
Family SizeHatchback Dummy -0.000764* (0.000462)
Family SizeSedan Dummy -0.000608* (0.000363)
AgeSafety Index -0.00000409 (0.00000506)
Family SizePower Ratio -0.0115 (0.00768)
KM Measurement Error() 0.789*** (0.00888)
Scale Factor() 1.77*** (0.201)
(Standard Standard (Standard
RANDOM Coefficient Error) Deviation Error)
IncomeRent() -5.37*** (0.593) 1.44*** (0.233)
Operating Cost() -1.53*** (0.0877) 0.00658 (0.100)
Engine Size 0.00167 (0.00127) 0.00128* (0.000748)
Power Ratio -0.0425* (0.0245) 0.148* (0.0838)
Torque 0.000281 (0.000171) 0.0000369 (0.0000300)
Length -0.0243* 0.0133 0.000413 (0.000318)
Width 0.0114* 0.00661 0.00356 (0.00232)
Height 0.00604 0.00383 0.000881* (0.000534)
Ground Clearance 0.0928* (0.0524) 0.0233 (0.0145)
Weight 0.0110* (0.00621) 0.00590* (0.00346)
Notes: This table presents full information maximum likelihood coefficient estimates
with 10 make fixed effects (not shown). Integrals simulated using 200 shifted and
shuffled Halton draws. Number of Observations 4454, LL  18226 at convergence.
*-p  10%, **-p  5%, ***-p  1%.
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Table 3.9: Demand Model Parameter Estimates—2008
(Standard
FIXED Coefficient Error)
Hatchback Dummy 0.00939*** (0.00195)
Sedan Dummy 0.0190*** (0.00284)
Age -0.00473*** (0.000793)
Female Dummy -0.208*** (0.0385)
Family Size 0.0384*** (0.00511)
Gears 0.0115*** (0.00173)
Automatic 0.00119 (0.00147)
Safety Index 0.00316*** (0.000861)
Luxury Index -0.000446** (0.000222)
Family SizeHatchback Dummy -0.00159*** (0.000289)
Family SizeSedan Dummy -0.00139*** (0.000299)
AgeSafety Index -0.0000194 (0.0000157)
Famil ySizePower Ratio -0.00891* (0.00537)
KM Measurement Error() 0.646*** (0.0149)
Scale Factor() 0.948*** (0.0919)
(Standard Standard (Standard
RANDOM Coefficient Error) Deviation Error)
IncomeRent() -3.88*** (0.102) 0.00488 (0.0534)
Operating Cost() -1.33*** (0.0562) 0.391*** (0.0238)
Engine Size -0.00555** (0.00222) 0.0184 (0.00244)
Power Ratio -0.0164 (0.0351) 0.00732 (0.0239)
Torque -0.000263 (0.0000524) 0.00000898 (0.0000998)
Length -0.0201*** (0.00282) 0.00150 (0.00299)
Width 0.00497 (0.00440) 0.00510 (0.00808)
Height 0.00838** (0.00346) 0.0106 (0.00665)
Ground Clearance 0.0771*** (0.0230) 0.0171 (0.0399)
Weight 0.0143*** (0.00389) 0.00755 (0.00482)
Notes: This table presents full information maximum likelihood coefficient estimates
with 11 make fixed effects (not shown). Integrals simulated using 200 shifted and
shuffled Halton draws. Number of Observations 5865, LL  25906 at convergence.
*-p  10%, **-p  5%, ***-p  1%.
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Table 3.10: Demand Model Parameter Estimates—2010
(Standard
FIXED Coefficient Error)
Hatchback Dummy 0.0000365 (0.00147)
Sedan Dummy 0.0142*** (0.00243)
Age -0.00735*** (0.000838)
Female Dummy -0.253*** (0.0355)
Family Size 0.0458*** (0.00626)
Gears 0.0154*** (0.00168)
Automatic -0.00169 (0.00269)
Safety Index 0.00173** (0.000770)
Luxury Index 0.00296*** (0.000344)
Family SizeHatchback Dummy -0.00281*** (0.000339)
Family SizeSedan Dummy -0.00203*** (0.000354)
AgeSafety Index 0.0000129 (0.0000162)
Family SizePower Ratio 0.00108 (0.00558)
KM Measurement Error() 1.00*** (0.00914)
Scale Factor() 0.772*** (0.0675)
(Standard Standard (Standard
RANDOM Coefficient Error) Deviation Error)
IncomeRent() -3.45*** (0.0851) 0.0357 (0.0619)
Operating Cost() -1.17*** (0.0702) 0.0123 (0.138)
Engine Size 0.0164*** (0.00225) 0.00192 (0.00403)
Power Ratio 0.0323 (0.0339) 0.000636 (0.0247)
Torque -0.000216*** (0.0000551) 0.0000271 (0.0000942)
Length -0.0512*** (0.00578) 0.00733*** (0.00210)
Width -0.0368*** (0.00506) 0.000263 (0.00520)
Height -0.0223*** (0.00309) 0.000188 (0.00760)
Ground Clearance 0.179*** (0.0298) 0.00208 (0.0421)
Weight 0.0315*** (0.00431) 0.000401 (0.00197)
Notes: This table presents full information maximum likelihood coefficient estimates
with 12 make fixed effects (not shown). Integrals simulated using 200 shifted and
shuffled Halton draws. Number of Observations 6475, LL  32013 at convergence.
*-p  10%, **-p  5%, ***-p  1%.
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petrol 71.7% 72.4% 76.3% 76.3%
diesel 28.3% 27.6% 23.7% 23.7%
Average Driving Distance
(km{montℎ)
petrol 1020 1020 1020 1020
diesel 1350 1300 987 1350
Total Fuel Consumption
(106 L)
petrol 826 834 879 879













Notes: This table presents policy simulation results for year 2006 using parameter
estimates presented in Table 3.8. 2006 petrol and diesel fuel prices (in 2010 Rs./liter)
were 61.4 and 42.5, respectively. Thus, a 5.60% diesel fuel tax amounts to 2.38 Rs. and a
44.5% diesel fuel tax amounts to 18.9 Rs. In both cases, the existing tax on petrol fuel is
assumed to equal 18.9 Rs.
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petrol 68.7% 70.5% 76.6% 76.6%
diesel 31.3% 29.5% 23.4% 23.4%
Average Driving Distance
(km{montℎ)
petrol 970 970 967 966
diesel 1370 1280 971 1365
Total Fuel Consumption
(106 L)
petrol 864 886 962 962













Notes: This table presents policy simulation results for year 2008 using parameter
estimates presented in Table 3.9. 2008 petrol and diesel fuel prices (in 2010 Rs./liter)
were 54.2 and 37.8, respectively. Thus, an 8.12% diesel fuel tax amounts to 3.07 Rs. and
a 43.3% diesel fuel tax amounts to 16.4 Rs. In both cases, the existing tax on petrol fuel
is assumed to equal 16.4 Rs.
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petrol 67.6% 69.6% 76.2% 76.2%
diesel 32.4% 30.4% 23.8% 23.8%
Average Driving Distance
(km{montℎ)
petrol 978 978 977 977
diesel 1320 1250 990 1330
Total Fuel Consumption
(106 L)
petrol 1330 1370 1490 1490













Notes: This table presents policy simulation results for year 2010 using parameter
estimates presented in Table 3.10. 2010 petrol and diesel fuel prices (in 2010 Rs./liter)
were 51.1 and 38.1, respectively. Thus, a 6.85% diesel fuel tax amounts to 2.61 Rs. and a
34.3% diesel fuel tax amounts to 13.1 Rs. In both cases, the existing tax on petrol fuel is
assumed to equal 13.1 Rs.
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Figure 3.1: Dieselization Across Passenger Vehicle Segments















































































































































































































































































Figure 3.8: Expected Compensating Variation For Diesel Buyers (44.5% Diesel Fuel Tax vs.
24.0% Diesel Car Tax)—2006
























44.5% Diesel Fuel Tax
24.5% Diesel Car Tax
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Figure 3.9: Expected Compensating Variation For Diesel Buyers (43.3% Diesel Fuel Tax vs.
22.9% Diesel Car Tax)—2008























Annual Income (105 Rs. 2010)
43.3% Diesel Fuel Tax
23.3% Diesel Car Tax
Figure 3.10: Expected Compensating Variation For Diesel Buyers (34.3% Diesel Fuel Tax vs.
17.5% Diesel Car Tax)—2010
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Chapter 2 Supplement–OLS and IV First Stage Results
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IV 0.490*** 0.441*** 0.285*** 1.22***
(0.0862) (0.0839) (0.0640) (0.292)
Weight -2.34*** -1.79 -1.73** -5.03
(0.705) (1.63) (0.789) (3.60)
Engine Size -0.00865*** 0.00104 -0.00000368 -0.00230**
(0.00100) (0.000635) (0.000662) (0.000990)
Torque 0.636*** 0.0294 -0.0725 0.180***
(0.110) (0.0413) (0.0632) (0.0458)
Luxury Index -0.0285 0.0696 0.0283 0.0179
(0.0399) (0.0674) (0.0362) (0.101)
Safety Index 0.0317 0.270 -0.251*** 0.0552
(0.101) (0.146) (0.0723) (0.259)
Automatic -0.707*** -0.970***
(0.270) (0.293)
y2003 -0.235 -0.166 -0.704*** -2.20***
(0.205) (0.301) (0.200) (0.681)
y2004 -0.343 -0.316 -0.534*** -2.23***
(0.211) (0.303) (0.197) (0.685)
y2005 -0.427** -1.50 -1.137*** -3.19***
(0.203) (0.322) (0.211) (0.623)
y2006 -0.502** -1.72*** -0.504** -3.11***
(0.202) (0.344) (0.201) (0.650)
y2007 -0.210 -1.58*** -0.488** -3.14***
(0.214) (0.322) (0.209) (0.636)
y2008 -0.448** -1.59*** -0.366 -3.41***
(0.213) (0.409) (0.233) (0.685)
Constant 12.8*** 8.52*** 9.66*** 5.40
(0.998) (2.33) (1.04) (5.93)
Observations 236 64 216 42
R2 0.699 0.699 0.546 0.843
Notes: This table presents first stage results of IV estimation of hedonic price
function specification 4. Standard errors are in parentheses, ***p   0.01, **p  
0.05, *p   0.1.
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Table A.2: Hedonic Price Function OLS Estimation Results–Petrol Hatchback
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price)
City Fuel Economy 0.0144** 0.000870 0.0128 0.00381
(0.00673) (0.00739) (0.00776) (0.00860)
Weight 0.872*** 1.161*** 0.393*** 0.379***
(0.0657) (0.0977) (0.100) (0.0992)
Power Ratio 9.905*** 13.63***
(0.912) (1.301)




Luxury Index 0.0724*** 0.0709*** 0.0833*** 0.0834***
(0.00506) (0.00492) (0.00547) (0.00542)
Safety Index -0.0276** -0.0300** -0.0179 -0.0178
(0.0123) (0.0120) (0.0138) (0.0136)
Automatic 0.134*** 0.129*** 0.100*** 0.0873**
(0.0338) (0.0328) (0.0377) (0.0378)
y2003 -0.0712*** -0.0799*** -0.0466* -0.0479*
(0.0242) (0.0236) (0.0270) (0.0268)
y2004 -0.143*** -0.144*** -0.129*** -0.126***
(0.0256) (0.0249) (0.0288) (0.0285)
y2005 -0.221*** -0.231*** -0.198*** -0.202***
(0.0247) (0.0241) (0.0276) (0.0274)
y2006 -0.166*** -0.172*** -0.163*** -0.169***
(0.0247) (0.0240) (0.0277) (0.0276)
y2007 -0.277*** -0.281*** -0.297*** -0.309***
(0.0254) (0.0247) (0.0285) (0.0287)
y2008 -0.302*** -0.312*** -0.331*** -0.350***
(0.0243) (0.0237) (0.0271) (0.0281)
Constant -0.208 -0.198 0.477*** 0.677***
(0.145) (0.141) (0.137) (0.161)
Observations 244 244 244 244
R2 0.881 0.888 0.850 0.853
Notes: This table presents hedonic price function OLS estimation results using
petrol hatchbacks for years 2002 to 2008. To analyze sensitivity of results, we
present four different specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses, ***p  
0.01, **p   0.05, *p   0.1.
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Table A.3: Hedonic Price Function OLS Estimation Results–Diesel Hatchback
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price)
City Fuel Economy 0.0323*** 0.0319*** 0.0252** 0.0249**
(0.0103) (0.0101) (0.0105) (0.0101)
Weight 1.10*** 0.925*** 0.527*** 0.374**
(0.139) (0.166) (0.138) (0.145)
Power Ratio 7.63*** 6.80***
(1.15) (1.21)




Luxury Index 0.0432*** 0.0455*** 0.0436*** 0.0462***
(0.00663) (0.00660) (0.00659) (0.00637)
Safety Index 0.00801 -0.000570 0.00728 -0.00352
(0.0139) (0.0143) (0.0138) (0.0139)
Automatic 0 0 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0)
y2003 -0.0781*** -0.0884*** -0.0806*** -0.0937***
(0.0290) (0.0288) (0.0289) (0.0280)
y2004 -0.160*** -0.160*** -0.154*** -0.155***
(0.0294) (0.0287) (0.0293) (0.0279)
y2005 -0.153*** -0.149*** -0.154*** -0.150***
(0.0331) (0.0324) (0.0330) (0.0315)
y2006 -0.0728** -0.0581 -0.0777** -0.0590*
(0.0353) (0.0354) (0.0352) (0.0344)
y2007 -0.215*** -0.195*** -0.221*** -0.196***
(0.0327) (0.0337) (0.0327) (0.0327)
y2008 -0.299*** -0.257*** -0.320*** -0.268***
(0.0353) (0.0410) (0.0364) (0.0404)
Constant -0.379 -0.328 0.476** 0.434*
(0.237) (0.233) (0.229) (0.219)
Observations 64 64 64 64
R2 0.877 0.885 0.878 0.891
Notes: This table presents hedonic price function OLS estimation results using
diesel hatchbacks for years 2002 to 2008. To analyze sensitivity of results, we
present four different specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses, ***p  
0.01, **p   0.05, *p   0.1.
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Table A.4: Hedonic Price Function OLS Estimation Results–Petrol Sedan
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price)
City Fuel Economy 0.0472*** 0.0442*** 0.0264** 0.0260**
(0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0106)
Weight 1.87*** 1.63*** 0.815*** 0.842***
(0.0899) (0.126) (0.112) (0.112)
Power Ratio 8.99*** 7.40***
(0.679) (0.899)




Luxury Index 0.0579*** 0.0605*** 0.0668*** 0.0652***
(0.00566) (0.00572) (0.00535) (0.00534)
Safety Index -0.0188 -0.0108 0.00942 0.00571
(0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0120) (0.0120)
Automatic 0.179*** 0.181*** 0.174*** 0.168***
(0.0301) (0.0300) (0.0288) (0.0287)
y2003 0.00226 0.00733 0.0110 0.00635
(0.0367) (0.0365) (0.0350) (0.0348)
y2004 -0.121*** -0.122*** -0.126*** -0.126***
(0.0355) (0.0352) (0.0339) (0.0336)
y2005 -0.198*** -0.197*** -0.213*** -0.217***
(0.0377) (0.0376) (0.0362) (0.0360)
y2006 -0.212*** -0.212*** -0.245*** -0.254***
(0.0356) (0.0353) (0.0340) (0.0339)
y2007 -0.279*** -0.272*** -0.301*** -0.316***
(0.0355) (0.0354) (0.0340) (0.0342)
y2008 -0.352*** -0.348*** -0.375*** -0.387***
(0.0366) (0.0364) (0.0351) (0.0351)
Constant -1.254*** -1.027*** 0.124 0.156
(0.190) (0.207) (0.171) (0.170)
Observations 412 411 411 411
R2 0.919 0.921 0.927 0.928
Notes: This table presents hedonic price function OLS estimation results using
petrol sedans for years 2002 to 2008. To analyze sensitivity of results, we present
four different specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses, ***p   0.01,
**p   0.05, *p   0.1.
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Table A.5: Hedonic Price Function OLS Estimation Results–Diesel Sedan
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price) ln(Price)
City Fuel Economy 0.0137 0.0273*** 0.00866 0.0239**
(0.0103) (0.00983) (0.0112) (0.0107)
Weight 1.19*** 0.858*** 0.673** 0.375
(0.203) (0.198) (0.271) (0.255)
Power Ratio 7.70*** 6.88***
(1.14) (1.06)




Luxury Index 0.0974*** 0.0839*** 0.102*** 0.0874***
(0.00800) (0.00780) (0.00840) (0.00821)
Safety Index -0.0194 0.00858 -0.0135 0.0158
(0.0216) (0.0206) (0.0229) (0.0217)
Automatic 0.320*** 0.318*** 0.340*** 0.336***
(0.0487) (0.0448) (0.0514) (0.0472)
y2003 0.0496 0.0605 0.0826 0.0907*
(0.0506) (0.0466) (0.0531) (0.0487)
y2004 0.000737 -0.00652 0.0195 0.00980
(0.0513) (0.0472) (0.0544) (0.0500)
y2005 -0.135*** -0.135*** -0.117** -0.119**
(0.0512) (0.0472) (0.0546) (0.0502)
y2006 -0.168*** -0.165*** -0.144*** -0.144***
(0.0521) (0.0480) (0.0552) (0.0506)
y2007 -0.239*** -0.211*** -0.230*** -0.201***
(0.0506) (0.0469) (0.0543) (0.0502)
y2008 -0.324*** -0.300*** -0.317*** -0.292***
(0.0507) (0.0469) (0.0550) (0.0507)
Constant -0.158 -0.355 0.615* 0.314
(0.301) (0.279) (0.369) (0.343)
Observations 158 158 158 158
R2 0.936 0.946 0.928 0.939
Notes: This table presents hedonic price function OLS estimation results using
diesel sedans for years 2002 to 2008. To analyze sensitivity of results, we present
four different specifications. Standard errors are in parentheses, ***p   0.01,
**p   0.05, *p   0.1.
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Appendix B
Chapter 3 Supplement–Estimation Results Under Alternative
Interest Rate Assumptions
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Table B.1: Demand Model Parameter Estimates—2006 (r  0.05)
(Standard
FIXED Coefficient Error)
Hatchback Dummy 0.00842*** (0.00252)
Sedan Dummy 0.0194*** (0.00557)
Age -0.00739*** (0.00104)
Female Dummy -0.256*** (0.0477)
Family Size 0.0764*** (0.00717)
Gears 0.00562*** (0.00170)
Automatic 0.00397*** (0.00141)
Safety Index 0.000175 (0.000603)
Luxury Index -0.00169*** (0.000539)
Family SizeHatchbackDummy -0.000982*** (0.000319)
Family SizeSedanDummy -0.000826*** (0.000287)
AgeSafety Index -0.000000480 (0.00000505)
Family SizePower Ratio -0.00405 (0.00320)
KM Measurement Error () 0.788*** (0.00885)
Scale Factor () 1.64*** (0.172)
(Standard Standard (Standard
RANDOM Coefficient Error) Deviation Error)
IncomeRent () -4.95*** (0.288) 1.26*** (0.117)
Operating Cost () -1.52*** (0.0698) 0.00452 (0.0996)
Engine Size 0.00303** (0.00139) 0.00168*** (0.000592)
Power Ratio -0.0322 (0.0215) 0.0186* (0.0101)
Torque -0.000168 (0.000134) 0.000281*** (0.0000851)
Length -0.0349*** (0.00978) 0.000275 (0.000226)
Width 0.0230*** (0.00646) 0.000754 (0.00110)
Height 0.00668** (0.00319) 0.000569 (0.000658)
Ground Clearance 0.103** (0.0409) 0.0335** (0.0151)
Weight 0.0229*** (0.00765) 0.00584*** (0.00189)
Notes: This table presents full information maximum likelihood coefficient estimates
with 10 make fixed effects (not shown). Integrals simulated using 200 shifted and
shuffled Halton draws. Number of Observations 4454, LL  18239 at convergence.
*-p  10%, **-p  5%, ***-p  1%.
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Table B.2: Demand Model Parameter Estimates—2006 (r  0.12)
(Standard
FIXED Coefficient Error)
Hatchback Dummy 0.0122*** (0.00317)
Sedan Dummy 0.0264*** (0.00662)
Age -0.00751*** (0.00102)
Female Dummy -0.256*** (0.0472)
Family Size 0.0747*** (0.00706)
Gears 0.00776*** (0.00209)
Automatic 0.00572*** (0.00185)
Safety Index 0.000588 (0.000828)
Luxury Index -0.00234*** (0.000677)
Family SizeHatchback Dummy -0.00131*** (0.000370)
Family SizeSedan Dummy -0.00109*** (0.000337)
AgeSafety Index 0.00000105 (0.00000741)
Family SizePower Ratio -0.00544 (0.00399)
KM Measurement Error () 0.788*** (0.00916)
Scale Factor () 2.0922*** (0.215)
(Standard Standard (Standard
RANDOM Coefficient Error) Deviation Error)
IncomeRent () -4.85*** (0.250) 1.26*** (0.107)
Operating Cost () -1.50*** (0.0686) 0.0207 (0.101)
Engine Size 0.00310 (0.00190) 0.00260*** (0.000755)
Power Ratio -0.0851*** (0.0322) 0.000129 (0.00954)
Torque -0.000161 (0.000188) 0.000398*** (0.000116)
Length -0.0469*** (0.0117) 0.000213 (0.000288)
Width 0.0289*** (0.00739) 0.000348 (0.00155)
Height 0.00882** (0.00421) 0.000518 (0.000882)
Ground Clearance 0.155*** (0.0576) 0.0257 (0.0168)
Weight 0.0356*** (0.0105) 0.00354*** (0.00107)
Notes: This table presents full information maximum likelihood coefficient estimates
with 10 make fixed effects (not shown). Integrals simulated using 200 shifted and
shuffled Halton draws. Number of Observations 4454, LL  18242 at convergence.
*-p  10%, **-p  5%, ***-p  1%.
95
Bibliography
Ajanovic, A. (2011). The effects of dieselization of the European passenger car fleet
on energy consumption and CO2 emissions. Working Paper, Energy Economics
Group, Vienna University of Technology .
Alcott, H. and N. Wozny (2010, March). Gasoline prices, fuel economy, and the
energy paradox. Unpublished Manuscript .
Anderson, S., R. Kellogg, and J. Sallee (2010). What do consumers believe about
future gasoline prices? Unpublished Manuscript .
Arora, S., A. Vyas, and L. R. Johnson (2011). Projections of highway vehicle pop-
ulation, energy demand, and CO2 emissions in India to 2040. Natural Resources
Forum 35, 4962.
Atkinson, S. E. and R. Halvorsen (1984). A new hedonic technique for estimating
attribute demand: An application to the demand for automobile efficiency. The
Review of Economics and Statistics 66 (3), 417–426.
Baidya, S. and J. Borken-Kleefeld (2009). Atmospheric emissions from road trans-
portation in India. Energy Policy 37 (10), 3812–3822.
Barth, M., N. Davis, J. Lents, and N. Nikkila (2007). Vehicle activity patterns and
emissions in Pune, India. Transportation Research Record (2038), 155–166.
Bento, A., L. Goulder, M. Jacobsen, and R. von Haefen (2009). Distributional
and efficiency impacts of increased U.S. gasoline taxes. American Economic Re-
view 99 (3), 1–37.
Bento, A. M., M. L. Cropper, A. M. Mobarak, and K. Vinha (2005, August). The
effects of urban spatial structure on travel demand in the United States. The
Review of Economics and Statistics 87 (3), 466–478.
Brand, K. (2005). A structural model of health plan choice and health care demand
in the Medicare managed care program. Working Paper .
Carazoo.com (2011, March 7). Car loans–more than meets the eye. www.carazoo.-
com/article/1606200801/Car-LoansMore-Than-Meets-the-EyeS.
Central Pollution Control Board (2010). Status of the Vehicular Pollution Control
Programme in India. Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India.
Chaturvedi, B. K. (2008). Report of the High Powered Committee on Financial
Position of Petroleum Companies. Petroleum Ministry, Government of India.
Chugh, R., M. Cropper, and U. Narain (2011, November). The cost of fuel economy
in the Indian passenger vehicle market. Energy Policy 39, 7174–7183.
96
Cropper, M. L., L. B. Deck, and K. E. McConnell (1988, November). On the choice
of functional form for hedonic price functions. The Review of Economics and
Statistics 70 (4), 668–75.
Dargay, J., D. Gately, and M. Sommer (2007). Vehicle ownership and income growth,
worldwide: 1960–2030. Working Paper .
de la Rue du Can, S., V. Letschert, M. McNeil, N. Zhou, and J. Sathaye (2009).
Residential and transport energy use in India: Past trend and future outlook.
Technical Report, Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory .
Dubin, J. and D. McFadden (1984, March). An econometric analysis of residential
electric appliance holdings and consumption. Econometrica 52 (2), 345–362.
Economides, N., K. Seim, and V. B. Viard (2008). Quantifying the benefits of entry
into local phone service. The RAND Journal of Economics 39 (3), 699–730.
Environmental Protection Agency (2008). Light-Duty Automotive Technology and
Fuel Economy Trends: 1975 Through 2008. Office of Transportation and Air
Quality.
Espey, M. and S. Nair (2005). Automobile fuel economy: What is it worth? Con-
temporary Economic Policy 23 (3), 317–323.
Feng, Y., D. Fullerton, and L. Gan (2005, August). Vehicle choices, miles driven
and pollution policies. NBER Working Paper Series (Working Paper 1153).
Gillingham, K. (2010, December). How do consumers respond to gasoline price
shocks? Heterogeneity in vehicle choice and driving behavior. Working Paper .
Goldberg, P. K. (1998, March). The effects of the Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency
standard in the U.S. The Journal of Industrial Economics 46 (1), 1–33.
Gonzalez, R. M., R. M. Lorenzo-Alegra, G. A. Marrero, and A. Esquivel (2011,
March). The effect of dieselization in road transport emissions: the case of Span-
ish regions between 1998 and 2006. Working Paper, Instituto Universitario de
Desarrollo Regional .
Greene, D. (2010). How Consumers Value Fuel Economy: A Literature Review. U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Transportation and Air Quality.
Helfand, G. and A. Wolverton (2010). Evaluating the Consumer Response to Fuel
Economy: A Review of the Literature. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
National Center for Environmental Economics.
Herriges, J. and C. Kling (1999, February). Nonlinear income effects in random
utility models. The Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (1), 62–72.
Industry News (2010, February). Huatai B11–China’s first diesel sedan? www.
chinacartimes.com/2010/02/03/huatai-b11-chinas-first-diesel-sedan/.
97
Jolly, D. (2010, October). Booming car sales in China may bypass diesels. www.
nytimes.com/2010/10/03/automobiles/BMW-PARIS.html.
Kathuria, V. (2002). Vehicular pollution control in Delhi. Transportation Research
Part D 7, 373387.
Klier, T. and J. Linn (2008). New vehicle characteristics and the cost of the Cor-
porate Average Fuel Economy standard. Working Paper Series WP-08-13.
Kulshrestha, T. (2010, July). Oil’s well. business.outlookindia.com/
printarticle.aspx?266424.
Li, S., C. Timmins, and R. von Haefen (2009). How do gasoline prices affect fleet
fuel economy? American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1 (2), 113–37.
Lu, S. (2006). Vehicle survivability and travel mileage schedules. Technical Report
DOT HS 809 952, U.S. Department of Transportation.
McFadden, D. (1995). Computing willingness-to-pay in random utility models.
Working Paper .
Narain, U. and A. Krupnick (2007, February). The impact of Delhi’s CNG program
on air quality. Discussion Paper, Resources For The Future.
NCAER (2005). Comprehensive Study to Assess the Genuine Demand and Re-
quirement of SKO (Special Kerosene Oil). National Council of Applied Economic
Research.
Panagariya, A. (2008). India: The Emerging Giant. Oxford University Press.
Parikh, K. S. (2010). Report of the Expert Group on a Viable and Sustainable System
of Pricing of Petroleum Products. Government of India.
PR Newswire (2011, September). U.S. clean diesel automobile sales are up 37
percent over 2010. news.yahoo.com/u-clean-diesel-automobile-sales-37-
percent-over-172505586.html.
Ranawat, M. and R. Tiwari (2009). Influence of government policies on industry
development: The case of India’s automotive industry. Working Paper .
Sallee, J., S. West, and W. Fan (2010, June). The effect of gasoline prices on
the demand for fuel economy in used vehicles: Empirical evidence and policy
implications. Unpublished Manuscript .




Shankar, N. (2007, October 17). Auto loan interest rates slashed by bank
of India. www.financialexpress.com/news/auto-lenders-set-to-revise-
interest-rates/407419/.
Shenoy, B. V. (2010, March). Lessons learned from attempts to reform India’s
kerosene subsidy. Report, International Institute for Sustainable Development .
Spiller, E. (2011, January). Household vehicle bundle choice and gasoline demand:
A discrete-continuous approach. Working Paper .
The Hindu (2011, January). Centre to reintroduce chemical marker to check
kerosene diversion. www.thehindu.com/news/national/article1130308.ece?
homepage=true.
Train, K. (2000). Halton sequences for mixed logit. Working Paper .
Train, K. (2009). Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation. Cambridge University
Press.
Train, K. and C. Winston (2007, November). Vehicle choice behavior and the de-
clining market share of U.S. automakers. International Economic Review 48 (4),
1469–1496.
West, S. (2004). Distributional effects of alternative vehicle pollution control policies.
Journal of Public Economics 88, 735–757.
99
